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BLUE CHIP STAMPS

v.
MANOR DRUG STORES

Summary:

~. ~&.:/- ~ . ~ 11-J~

r

Federal/Civil (Securities)

This case presents the question of the continuing

viability of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 905

.

-c..
""''"'fr~y
Cert. to CA 9
(Browning, Choy~ Hufstedler
dissenting)
~~~~~~~~~~

(1952) which limited the . plaintiff class

in Rule lO(b) (5) damage actions to actual purchasers or sellers of
securities in the transaction called into question. . Resps

~

n the

immediate case were required to be offered certain shares of Blue
Chip as part of a plan of reorganization incorporated in an

-2-

antitrust consent decree.

Because of an allegedly misleading over-

t:::::;:...

pessimistic prospectus, they did not purchase the offered shares.
They later filed suit in USDC, seeking _the difference between the
offering price of the shares and their asserted fair market value.
They presented three theories:

liability of petrs under lO(b)

liability under §12 of the 1933 Securities Act [15 U.S.C.

(5)~

§77L]~

and liability of petr to them under the consent decree as its third
party beneficiaries.

The complaint was dismissed for failure to

state a claim by USDC [Kelleher] because of the literal inapplic ability of §12, the wording of the consent decree, and the fajlure
to satisfy the Birnbaum standing requirement for Rule lO(b) (5) . . A
panel 9f the 9th Ci.rcuit reversed holding that resps did have lO(b)
(5) standing (without passing on the remaining clajms) over a
vigorous dissent by Judge Hufstedler and the 9th Circuit denied
rehearing en bane with

f~ve

judges dissenting.

Petr now renews

his Birnbaum argument before this Court.
Facts:

Blue Chip Stamp is a company engaged in providing and

redeeming trading stamps used by retail stores.

Until 1967, it was

90% owned by eight large chain grocery corporations (also petrs
here and defendants below) who used its stamps.

A number of other

small retailers also used the stamps but owned none of Blue Chip's
stock.

An antitrust consent decree entered in that year between

the Government and the petrs provided for a reorganizatjon of Blue
Chip jn order to reduce the % of its shares held by the big retailers

,'

-3and increase the % of shares held by smaller retailers.

The decree

provided that (after a change of name reorganization was consumated)
Blue Chip was to make an offering of 621,000 shares (43% of the
company) first to the small retailers with any unpurchased shares
being offered to others.

The number of shares offered to each

small retailer was proportional to his prior stamp usage.

The

-----------------------------------------------------

offering was in package units with each package costing $100 and
consisting of three shares of common stock and one $100 comple-tely
subordinated debenture.

Resps allege that the actual fair market

value of th i s package was $315.
Some 60% of t he offering was purchased by small retailers.
The

re~aining

40% was not and seses as class representatives of the

non-accepting retailers seek some $20 million dollars in damages,
representing the aggregate of the difference between the offering
price of the non-accepted shares and the allegedly higher fair
market value of the non-accepted shares at the time of sale.

The

gravamen of resps' complaint is that the prospectus distributed in
connection with the offering (as required by §4 of the 1933
Securities Act) was materially misleading in its over-pessimistic
description of Blue Chip and its prospects.

For example, the

prospectus listed as potential contingent liabilities some $29
million in pending legal claims against Blue Chip although the
company and its control shareholders knew that many of these
claims were frivolous and in fact later settled these claims for

-4slightly over $1 million.
Rule 10 (b) (5), adopted pursuant to §10 (b) of the 1934 Secud ties
Exchange Act and similar in language to that section, prov1des in
pertinent part that "it shall be unlawful for any person, directly
or indirectly,
to defraud,

(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice

-

• • • in connection with the purchase or sale of any

security."
Contention:

The sole question presented in this petition is

whether the CA erred in holding that the resps, who neither purchased
t

\\

nor sold securities, had the requisite standing to maintain a

'-·

dama~e

--

action under Rul_;;_J O..(b,) (5) •
The CA majority [Pet. at Al-All] reasoned that the purpose of

the statute and rule were to insure a well :informed body of investors
so that the absence of a purchase or sale by a named plaintiff was
irrelevant to the rule's objective, noting for example that the SEC
in an amicus brief in this case called for total abandonment of
Birnbaum's purchaser/seller standing requirement.

Various cases for

example allowed plaintiffs, who could not maintain a damage act1on
because of failure to meet the purchaser/seller rule, to maintain an
action for injunctive relief.
remains applicable,

To the extent that the stand1ng rule

it does so only where other factors not presented

in the instant case are present.

Normally where the plaintiff has

neither purchased nor sold, it is :impossible for him to prove either
that he would have done so if the misleading conduct had not occurred

-5or at what price and when he would have done so.

Thus the purchaser/

seller "standing" rule is only a shorthand for saying that on the
alleged facts there is a failure of proof on both causaljty and loss.
Where a prior contractual relationship such as an option exists, the
"standing" rule does not apply since there is objective proof of an
intent to purchase or sell and a measure of damages may be determined.

--

Here the consent decree was the "functional equivalent" of a
prior contractual arrangement since it specified a discrete group of
offerees and a fixed price.

It provides objective evidence of both

causality and damages and hence the "standing" requirement sjmply
doesn't apply.
J~dge

Hufstedler didn't agree.

~

The decision conflicts those

""'
of every other circuit applying the purchaser/seller standing rule and
seeks to use a legal fiction to expand the reach of lO(b) (5).

While

decisions do recognize that plaintiffs holding contractual obligations
to purchase/sell (such as options or puts) do have standing even in
the absence of an executed purchase or sale, they do so because the
statute it!;lf [15

u.s.c.

§78c (a)]

~s

that "the terms 'buy' and

-

'purchase' each include any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwjse

.

acquire''.

~

,__

"'--='

\\

A consent decree of course is not such a contract under

this Court's decisions.

It creates no rights of enforcement jn

either the potential purchaser or the potential seller under a long
line of this Court's decisions.

If the standing rule exjsts, then

the presence or absence of proof of causation or damages js jrrelevant

'•

-6to whether or not it is met.

Although injunctive relief has been

granted to non-Birnbaum plaintiffs, this is because preventive
relief ought not be denied where the fraud hasn't been consumated
and because this form of relief doesn't involve the staggering
exposures to liability involved in damage suits by non-purchasers
and non-sellers.

There is no logical distinction between these

non-purchaser offerees and any others in a public offering.

At

the heart of the majority's decision is a misunderstanding of the
role of standing in the federal system.

It is not a form of snap

judgement pn the nature of the plaintiff's proof but rather a
c onfinement of remedy to that class of persons whom Congress intended
t o have it.

The loosening or elimination of the purchaser/seller

rule may incrementally increase disclosure but it will certainly
generate additional federal litigation, impose draconian damages on
offerors drastically increasing the cost of marketing securities,
invite strike suits, and drastically unsettle the market through
adding new, and unknown risk factors.

If the decision of the

majority applies only to this discrete group of offerees, then it is
simply bad law since there is no meaningful distinction between them
and other non-purchasers.

It is more likely that this decision

reaches all non-purchasers who may now await market developments
without risk, claiming deception caused non-buying if the value of
the securities proves more promising than the offeror's glum
predictions or claiming that deception caused non-selling if a rosy
prospectus is followed by a market decline.

-7The USDC mechanically applied Birnbaum's purchaser/seller rule.
Petrs generally repeat the CA dissent.

They point out that the 2d,

3rd, 5th, 6th, and 8th Circuits apply Birnbaum while the 7th Circuit
followed the 9th Circuit's lead in Eason v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3595
(April 22, 1974)

(Burger, C.J., Douglas and White, J.J. dissenting

from denial: Powell, J. not participating).

They further argue that

even Eason is distinguishable since the fraud alleged there was in
connection with a transfer of securities whereas here there was no
transfer and resps aren't purchasers, sellers, or investors.
' -·

They

point out that many cases have held that there are no derjvative
individual rights from an anti-trust consent decree.

[Pet. at 19-22].

Finally, they argue that the decision conflicts with the entire policy
of the 1933 and 1934 Acts which was to encourage disclosure of all
possible adverse aspects of a company in order to preclude "puffing"
of securities.
Resps argue that the instant decision is not tn conflict

w~th

Birnbaum since only a purely mechanistic application of Birnbaum
would have denied them standing.

Because of their right or entitlement

to purchase the shares under the consent decree, they stand jn the
same position as an option holder.

They valiantly seek to distinguish

many cases applying the Birnbaum rule and rely on Eason.
Discussion:

The status of the Birnbaum doctrine jn light of

this decision and that in Eason is perhaps the most fundamental

··-

I
, I

I

-8unsettled question in the federal securities area.

This decision

constitutes a thinly veiled overruling of the doctrine in the 9th
Circuit as Judge Hufstedler points out and replaces the purchaser/
seller rule with an inquiry into the quantum of available evidence
on causation and damages.

Because the federal securities laws apply

largely to issuers listed on national exchanges, whose shares are sold
interstate, and because of the extremely important ramifications of
the elimination of the rule, the current conflicting decisions. create
grave and unfair business uncertainties.
For

e~ample,

§§ 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act,

taken together with

Birnbaum under R. lO(b) (5), have meant that only actual purchasers
of newly offered shares could recover for inaccuracies in a prospectus.

Such purchasers of course have nothing to recover jf the

prospectus was over-gloomy and the company does better than the
prospectus indicates.

The result has been consistently over-

pessimistic prospectuses as a hedge against potential liability.

-

-

Exit Birnbaum and in comes the disappointed non-purchaser offeree
with a 10 (b) (5) cause of action.

The opinions in the case fully articulate the factors going
either way and the status of this rule ought to be decided by the
Court.
There is a response.
10/29/74

O'Neill

Ops in Pet.

Court

CA - 9

Voted on .. . ... .. .. .... .' . . . , 19 .. .

Argued ................... , 19 .. .

Assigned ..... . ..... .. .. . .. , 19 . . .

Submitted ................ , 19 .. .

Announced ................ , 19 .. .

No. 74-124

BLUE CHIP STAMPS, ET AL., Petitioners
vs.

MANOR DRUG STORES, ETC.

8/15/74

Cert. filed.

HOLD

JURISDICTIONAL
NOT
CERT.
MERITS
MOTION ABFOR t-----,--+--S.,...T_A_T_E.,...M_E_N_T..---1-----,--+---,---! SENT VOTG

D

N

POST

DIS

·/v .......... ..
Rehnquist, J ................. .
Powell, J .................... .
Blackmun, J ................. .
Marshall, J .................. .
White, J ..................... .
Stewart, J ................... .
Brennan, J ................... .
Douglas, J .................... .
Burger, Ch. J ................ .

:;; .............. ..

::: :~:::. :.::::::
/.:;····
·.;·····

·.;

....... .
....... .
............... .

... '!"" ....... .

AFF

REV

AFF

G

D

lNG

BENCH MEMORANDUM ·

TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Penny Clark

DATE:

March 18, 1975

No. 74-124 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores
The issue in this case is whether § lO(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the SEC's Rule lOb-5
afford a cause of action for damages to a person who alleges
that fraudulent misrepresentations within the definition of
that rule causel him not to buy a security that he could have
purchased.

This is not an issue of standing,although it is

usually described in those terms.

It has nothing to do with

Article III; it is solely an issue of the scope of the lOb-5
cause of action.

This Court has never endorsed the Birnbaum

rule and is writing on a clean slate.
I see two steps in the analysis of the issue:

first,

whether a person fraudulently induced not to buy a security
is within the scope of protection of the securities acts;
second, even if he is, whether the class of injuries is so
speculative that, as a matter of policy, the Court should
deny recovery in damages.
question one.

The SEC's amicus brief takes the position

that the securities acts were intended to protect all
investors from misrepresentation in connection with all
securities transactions.

Petitioner takes a

narro~r

view

2.
asserting that the securities acts are primarily designed
to prevent "puffing", and that overemphasis of negative
factors in a prospectus does not violate the policies of the
acts.

This seems too narrow a view of the securities acts.

Section lO(b) and Rule lOb-S have no such restrictions:

they

prohibit all misrepresentations and fraudulent silences in

------

connection with securities transactions, whatever the effect
on investors or potential investors.

I can easily imagine

a fraudulent scheme in which a bad guy trying to obtain control
of a corporation would put out false information to dissuade
other potential investors from purchasing, or to induce current
stockholders to sell their holdings.

I think both class es of

investors are within the umbrella of the securities acts'
protection.

I would therefore shift the burden of the analysis

to the second question.
Question two.

As a general proposition, I think it

cannot be denied that the class of claims by persons dissuaded
from buying securities is more speculative than the class of
claims by persons who were induced to buy, to sell, or to hold
securities they already owned.

All of these categories include

a certain number of speculative problems:

-------

"what I would have
-.....

done if I had known the truth" _is always difficult of proof.
The issues are even more speculative in class actions.
Nonetheless, if there is an actual purchase or sale, there
is a point of reference for measuring damages.

And if the

plaintiff claims that he held securities that would have

3.
sold but for the defendant's fraud, we at least know how
many shares he owned.

Even when there is only a contract for

sale or purchase of securities, the plaintiff's claim that he
(or exeltcis~ ~ Of~)
was induced not to honor the contractAhas some ring of certainty.
In a case like Blue Chip Stamps, however, the only certain

-

factor is the maximum subscription each plaintiff was offered.
(And most cases of claimants who were persuaded not to buy
will lack even that benchmark.)

To prove injury, the plaintiff

should have to establish that he intended to buy a certain
number of shares, that he had or could have obtained the money
to purchase them, and that the defendant's misrepresentation
induced him not to buy the stock.

If he should establish all

this, there is still a question whether his injury - loss of
a speculative chance of gain - should be cognizable in damages.

~The

claimant has suffered no out-of-pocket loss.

In Blue

Chip Stamps, the respondents ask the difference between the
"bargain" price of the offering and the market value of the
securities as of the time they were offered.

This measures

the respondents' loss of an expectation, however, and even
at that is more certain than the expectation loss of most
persons who would claim they were fraudulently dissuaded from
purchasing a security.

In sum, the category of claims that

Blue Chip Stamps represents is more speculative than other
categories of actions under Rule lOb-5.

One can reasonably

expect that far more of these suits would be started than
won, especially if the plaintiffs are required to sustain
an appropriately severe burden of proof.

4.
Against the problems of recognizing such a speculative
'

category of claims are the policies that prompted a private
cause of action under lOb-S in the first place:

the inadequacy

of the SEC's investigative and enforcement resources, and the
potential for reinforcement by private suits enforcing the
obligations imposed by the securities acts.

Some of the civil

remedies expressly included in the statutes seem to have such
an enforcement purpose; not all are strictly compensatory.
The SEC says that private enforcement is helpful.

Amicus

participation in this case, however, is not the only method
open to it for broadening the range of private enforcement:
the SEC's rulemaking power is probably broad enough to iustify
changing Rule lOb-S to eliminate any "purchaser-seller"
l~on.

Perhaps the rulemakers and the litigators have

a different set of priorities.
Recommendation:

I see two alternatives:

to hold that

persons dissuaded from buying securities may have a cause
of action under lOb-S if they meet an appropriate burden of
proof on reliance and injury; or to hold that there is no
cause of action.

The practical difference between the two

choices is whether these cases will be dismissed for failure
to state a claim or whether they will go to summary judgment
or trial.

My inclination is to deny the cause of action -

not on the basis of the mechanical "purchaser-seller" rule,
but because the claimed injury is too speculative to be

5.
cognizable in an action for damages.

I think wholly different

considerations should apply if the issue is availability of
injunctive relief, and I would not embrace the purchaser-seller
~

rule as a general proposi• tion but would await further
~

litigation in other factual settings.

P.C.
ss

?
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CHAMBERS OF'

..JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

May 9, 1975

Re:

No. 74-124

-

Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores

Dear Bill:
In due course I shall be writing a dissenting opinion for
this case.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
cc:

The Conference

of tfrt 'Pltitt~ ~ta.4s
'IDas!yiugto-n. gl. <!J. 20giJt~

%>nt1rt1ttt

~ou.rt

CHAMBERS Of'

May 12, 197 5

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re : No. 74-124 -- Blue Chip Stamps v . Manor Drug Stores

Dear Bill :
I shall wait to see Harry's dissent .
Sincerely,

7ftr.
T. M .

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
cc : The Conference

.:§uprttttt (!Jmtrl cf tfrt ~b .§tatts'Jll!fas-Jri:ngtcn. ~. ~ 20~JI. j
CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

May 12, 1975

74-124 - Blue Chip Stamps, et al.
v. Manor Drug Stores, Etc.
Dear Bill,
I am glad to join your opinion for the
Court in this case.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

..

..

(·

. ,

-

.inpunu <!f.ru:rt ttf tJr~ ~~b .jtatt~
._.asfringhm. ~. <!f. 2!1bT'l-~

CHAMBERS 01'"

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

May 16, 1975

Re:

No. 74-124 - Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to Conference

<!Jcurt of tlp! ~ti:tcb .;%italtg
2JUc;ur~mgtcn. ~. <q. 20§Jt.~

.§utrtcntt

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE

w~.

J. BRENNAN, JR.

May 27 , 1975

RE: No. 74-124

Blue Chip Stamps v . Manor Drug
Stores , etc .

Dear Harry :
Please join me in your fine dissent .

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Blackmun
cc: The Conference

~ltprttttt ~ourl

cf fltt ~~ ~taftg

~:t$Irbtg-Ltn. ~.

<!f.

':zngr'l-~

CHAM6ERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

/

May 29, 1975

Re:

No. 74-124 - Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Regards,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

..

.iu:vrtmt <!}ttttd of tfrt ~b .it,aftg
11Jaslrittgtttn.l9. <!}. 2ll.;t~.;l
CHAMBERS OF

June 2, 197 5

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re: No. 74-124, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug St ore s

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely.

pt(.
T.M.
Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

.in:prttm <!Jnnrt i!f f!rt 'J.ll.rri±tb .:§tatts~a,glyingtcn. ~. C!J. 2!!~'!-~
CHAMBERS OF

June 2, 1975

JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS

Dear Harry:
Kindly join me in your dissent
in BLUE CHIP v. MANOR DRUG STORES, 74-124.

William 0. Douglas

Mr. Justice Blackmun
cc:

The

Conference

..

/

June 4, 1975

No. 74-124

Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Prus Stores, Etc.

Dear Potter:
Thank you for joining my concurring opinion. You may
recall our conversation~ about the majority being charged
with "callousness toward the investing public". I enclose
a second draft of my concurring opinion, in which , I respond
to Harry's charges.

I have not yet circulated this draft, and would appreciate'
your views.

1

Sincerely,

Mr. , Justice Stewart
1

lfp/as

'

..

?-fl-ed-vL--' c::A_~

4) ~f-

~~-k~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

June 4, 1975

Re: No. 74-124, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores
Dear Lewis,
I should appreciate your adding my name to your
concurring opinion in this case.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

.inp:rtmt <!Jllltrl d tlrt ~~ ~htttg
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

June 5, 1975

No. 74-124 - Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, Etc.
Dear Lewis,
I think Part II in your amended concurring opinion is fine, and gladly join it.
I have noted in pencil on page 1 of the enclosed copy an extremely minor suggestion.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
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Umted States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
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Manor Drug Stores, Etc.
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Mn. JusTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the ~
Court.
This case requires us to consider whether the offerees
,1111
~L ~
of a stock offering, made pursuant to an antitrust consent M1:
s•• V \ If
- ; - / ~ decree and registered under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 ~
~IJ
U.S. C.§ 77a et seq. ("the 1933 Act"), may maintain a
- - J 1 A_
,
'~ PYV private cause of action for money damages where they t:AA•.J.. ~
allege that the offeror has violated tire provisions of Rule ~ •
~
lOb-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission, but
~
where they have neither purchased nor sold any of the tt:Z- ~
offered shares. See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., ~~-1)~~ ...64~ _. ~ 'I~
Py ,.,.~ ,, 193 F. 2d 461 (CA2), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952), --~ 7~
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In 1963 the UniWI State: filed • civil antitrust action
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a company in the business of providing trading stamps to
retailers, and nine retailers who owned 90% of its shares.
In 1967 the action was terminated by the entry of a consent decree. United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272
F . Supp. 432 (CD Cal. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Thrifty
Shoppers Script Co. v, llnited States, 389 U, S. ~

~ ~ ~ ~~ttJ).
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(1968).1 The decree contemplated a plan of reorganization whereby Old Blue Chip was to be merged into a
newly formed corporation "New Blue Chip." The holdings of the majority shareholders of Old Blue Chip were
to be reduced, and New Blue Chip, one of the petitioners
here, was required under the plan to offer a substantial
number of its shares of common stock to retailers who
had used the stamp service in the past but who were not
shareholders in the old company. Under the terms of
the plan, the offering to nonshareholder users was to be
proportional to past stamp usage and the shares were to
be offered in units consisting of common stock and
debentures.
The reorganization plan was carried out, the offering
was registered with the SEC as r2quired by the 1933 Act,
and a prospectus was distributed to all offerees as required by § 5 of that Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77e. Somewhat
more than 50% of the offered units were actually purchased. In 1970, two years after the offering, respondent,
a former user of the stamp service and therefore an
offeree of the 1968 offering, filed this suit in the United
States District Court for the Central District of California. Defendants below and petitioners here are Old
and New Blue Chip. eight of the nine majority shareholders of Old Blue Chip, and the directors of New Blue
Chip (collectively called "Blue Chip") ,
Respondent's complaint alleged, inter alia, that the
prospectus prepared and distributed by Blue Chip in
connection with the offering was materially misleading in
its overly pessimistic appraisal of Blue Chip's status and
t Neither respondent nor any of the members of his alleged clas~
were parties to the antitru:st action. The antitrust decree itself
provided no plan for the reorgamzation of Old Blue Chip but
instead ,merely directed the parties to the consent decree to present
tQ the court such a plan. Appendix, at 27, 31.
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future prospects. It alleged that Bhle Chip intentionally
made the prospectus overly pessimistic in order to discourage respondent and other members of the allegedly
large class whom it represents from accepting what was
intended to be a bargain offer, so that the rejected shares
might later be offered to the public at a higher price.
The complaint alleged that class members because of
and in reliance on the false and misleading prospectus
failed to purchase the offered units. Respondent therefore sought on behalf of the alleged class some $21,400,000
in damages representing the lost opportunity to purchase
the units; the right to purchase the previously rejected
units at the 1968 price, and in addition, it sought some
$25,000,000 in exemplary damages.
The only portion of the litig&.tion thus initiated which
is before us is whether respondent may base its action
on Rule 10 (b)(5) of the Securities and Exchange Commission without having either bought or sold the shares
described in the allegedly misleading prospectus. The
District Court dismissed respondent's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief might be granted. 2
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, respondent pressed only his asserted cls.tim
under Rule lOb-5, and a divided panel of the Court of
Appeals sustained his position and reversed the District
Court. 3 After the Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en
bane, we granted Blue Chip's petition for certiorari.
U. S. - . Our consideration of the correctness of
the determination of the Court of Appeals requires us
to consider what limitations there are on the class of
plaintiffs who may maintain a private cause of action for
money damages for violation of Rule lOb-5, and whether
respondent was within that cla.~s.
2

8

...

The District Court opinion is reported at 339 F. Supp. 35.
The Court of AppNils opmion is reported at 492 F . 2d 138•
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II
During the early days of the "New Deal," Congress
enacted two landmark statutes regulating securities.
The Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15
U. S. C. § 77a et seq., was described as "an Act to provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities
sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through
the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and
for other purposes." The "Securities Exchange Act of
1934," 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 78a et seq.,
was described as an Act "to provide for the regulation of
securities exchanges and of over-the-counter markets
operating in interstate and foreign commerce and through
the mails, to prevent i'1equitable and unfair practices
on such exchanges and markets, and for other purposes."
The various sections of the Act of 1933 dealt at some
length with the required contents of registration statements and prospectuses, and expressly provided for
private civil causes of action. Section 11 (a) gave a
right of action by reason of a false registration statement
to "~!_ny person acquiring" the security, and § 12 of that
Act gave a right to sue the seller of a security who had
engaged in proscribed practices with respect to prospectuses and communication to "the person purchasing
the said security frem him." "'The Act ol 1934 was divided into two titles. Title I
was denominated "regulation of securities exchanges,"
and Title II was denominated "amendments to Securities Act of 1933." Section 10 of the Act of 19,34 made
it "unlawful for any person-:- . (b) to use or employ, in
connection with the purchase
8ale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as neces-

or

I
t() (t)
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sary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.'' The "Commission" referred to
in the section was the Securities and Exchange Commission created by ~ 4 (a) of the Act of 1934. Section 29
of that Act provided that "every contract made in violation of any provision of this Title or of any rule or
regulation thereunder" shouid be void.
In 1942, acting under the authority granted to it by
§ 10 (b) of the Act of 1934, the Commission promulgated
Rule 10b-5, providing as follows:
"§ 240.10b-5 Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices.
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice
to defraud,
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
" (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course
of business which operates or would operate as
s, fraud or deceit upon any person,
"i!!_ connection with the purchase or sale of any
security."
Section 10 (b) of the 1934 Act does not by its terms
provide an express civil remedy for its violation. Nor
does the history of this provision provide any indication
that Congress considered the problem of private suits
under it at the time of its passage, See, e. g., Note, Implied Liability Under the Securities Exchange Act, 61
Harv: L. Rev. 859, 861 (1948); A. Bromberg, Securities

-

I

3
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I

Law: Fraud-SEC Rule lOb-5 § 2.2, at 300-340
(1968); S. Rep. No. 792, ~3d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 5-6
{1934). Similarly there is no indication that the Commission in adopting Rule lOb-5 considered the question
of private civil remedies under this provision. SEC Se~
curities Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (1942); Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22
Bus. Law. 793, 922 ( 1967) ; Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp., supra, 193 F. 2d, at 463; 3 L. Loss, Securities
Regulation, at 1469 n. 87 (1961),
Despite the contrast between the provisions of Rule
10b-5 and the numerous carefully drawn express civil
remedies provided in both the Acts of 1933 and 1934/
it was held in 1946 by the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pem'!.sylvania that there was
an implied private right of action under the Rule. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (1946),
This Court had no occasion to deal with the subject until
20-odd years later, and at that time we confirmed with
virtually no discussion the overwhelmin consensus of
the c 1s
ourts an cour s o a
cause
o actwn id ex1st. upenntendent of Insurance v,
B7.iri:ke'rs Life aw:;d Casualty Co., 404 U. S. 6, 13 n. 9
(1971); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128, 150-154 (1972). Such a conclusion was, of course,
entirely consistent with the Court's recognition in J. 1,
Case Corp. v. Borak, 377 TJ. S. 426, 432 (1964), that private enforcement of Commission rules may "[provide] a
necessary supplement to Commission action."
Within a few years after the seminal Kardon decision,
See, e. g., § 11 of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77k; § 12 of the
1933 Act, 15 U.S. C.§ 771; § 15 of tnc 1933 Act , 15 U. S. C. § 77o;
§ 9 of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78i; § 16 of the 1934 Act, 15
U. S. C. § 78p; § 18 of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78r ; § 20 of tlle'
1934 Act, 15, U. S, C. ! 78t.
4
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the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded
that the plaintiff class for purposes of a private damage
action under § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5 was limited to
ac!._ual gurchasers and sellers of securities. Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Co1p., supra.
The Court of Appeals in this case did not repudiate
Birnbaum ,· indeed, another panel of that court (in an
opinion by Judge Ely) had but a short time earlier
affirmed the rule of that case. M aunt Clemmons Industries v. Bell, 464 F. 2d 339 (CA9 1972). But in this
case a majority of the Court of Appeals found that the
facts warranted an exception to the Birnbaum rule. For
the rea::;ons hereinafter stated, we are of the opinion that
Birnbaum was rightly rlecided, and that it bars respondent from maintaining this suit under Rule lOb-5.

III
The panel which decided Birnbaum consisted of Chief
Judge Swan and Judges Learned Hand and Augustus
Hand : the opinion was written by the latter. Since
both § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5 proscribed only fraud "in
connection with the purchase or sale" of securities, and
since the history of § 10 (b) revealed no congressional
intention to extend a private civil remedy for money
damages to other than defrauded purchasers or sellers of
securities, in contrast to the express civil remedy provided by § 16 (b) of the 1934 Act, the court concluded
that the plaintiff class in a Rule lOb-5 action was limited
to actual purchasers and sellers. 193 F. 2d 461, 463-464.
Just as this Court had no occasion to consider the
validity of the Kardon holding that there was a private
cause of action under Rule lOb-5 until 20-odd years
later, nearly the same period of time has gone by between
the Birnbaum decision and our consideration of the case
now before us. As with Kardon, virtually all lower

'

.
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federal courts facing the issue in the hundreds of reported
cases presenting this question over the past quarter century have reaffirmed Birnbaum's conclusion that the
...
plaintiff class for purposes of § To (b) and Rule 10b-5
private damage action is limited to purchasers and sellers of securities. See 6 L. Loss, Securities Regulation,
at 3617. See, e. g., Haberman v. Murchison, 468 F. 2d
1305, 1311 (CA2 1972); Landry v. FDIC, 486 F. 2d 139,
156-157 (CA3 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974);
Sargent v. Genesco, 492 F. 2d 750, 763 (CA5 1974); Simmons v. Wolfson, 428 F. 2d 455, 456 (CA6 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U. S. 999 (1971); City National Bank v.
Vanderboom, 422 F. 2d 221, 227-228 (CAS), cert. denied,
399 U.S. 905 (1970); Mount Clemens Industries, Inc. v.
Bell, 464 F. 2d 339 (CA9 1972); Jensen v. Voyles, 393
F. 2d 131, 133 (CAlO 1967). Compare Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F. 2d 654 (CA7 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974), with Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F. 2d 262 (CA7), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
977 (1967).
In 1957 and again in 1959, the Securities and Exchange Commission sought from Congress amendment of
§ 10 (b) to change its wording from "in connection with
the purchase or sale or any security" to "in connection
with the purchase or sale of. or any attempt to purchase
or sell, any security." (Emphasis added.) 103 Cong.
Rec. 11636 (1957); SEC Legislation, Hearings before
Subcom. of Sen. Com. on Banking & Currency on
S. 1178-1182, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 367-368 (1959)';
S. 2545, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); S. 1179, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess, (1959). In the words of a memorandum
submitted by the Commission to a congressional committee, the purpose of the proposed change wa,s "to make '
section 10 (b) also applicable to manipulative activities
in cQnnectio!lll with any attempt to purchase or sell any

74-124-0PINION
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security." Hearings on S. 1178-1182, supra, at 331.
Opposition to the amendment was based on fears of the
extension of civil liability under § 10 (b) that it would
cause. I d., at 368. Neither change was adopted by
Congress.
The longstanding acceptance by the courts, coupled
with Congress' failure to reject Birnbaum's reasonable
interpretation of the wording of § 10 (b), wording which
is directed towards injury suffered "in connection with
the purchase and sale" of securities, argues significantly
in favor of acceptance of the Birnbaum rule by this
Court. Blau v. Lehman, 368 U. S. 403, 413 (1962).
Available extrinsic evidence from the texts of the 1933
and 1934 AMS as to tlie congressional scheme in this
regard, though not conclusive, also tends to support the
result reached by the Birnbaum court. The wording of
§ 10 (b) directed at fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale" of securities stands in contrast with the
parallel antifraud provision of the 1933 Act, § 17 (a),
15 U. S. C. § 77q,S reaching fraud "in the offer or sale"

--

I)

......_

-:

_____...

§ 17 (a) of the 1933 Act provides in wording virtually identical
. to that of Rule lOb-5 with the exception of the italicized portion
that:
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any
securities by the use of any means or instntments of transportation
or communication in interstate commerce "or by the use of the mails,
directly or indirectly" ( 1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
"(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue state.
ment of a material fact or any omi~sion to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstanr.es under which they were made, not misleading, or
" (3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of busi.
ness which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon.
the purchaseL" (Emphasis added.)
We express, of course, no opinion on whether § 17 (a) in light of
the express civil remedies of the 1933 Act gives rises to an implied
11

lr
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of securities. Ci. § 5 of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. 77e.
When Congress wished to provide a remedy to those who \
neither purchase nor sell securities, it had little trouble
in doing so expressly. Cf. § 16 (b) of the 1934 Act, 15
U. S. C. § 78p.
Section 28 (a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77bb,
which limits recovery in any private damage action
brought under the 1934 Act to "actual damages," likewise provides some support for the purchaser-seller rule.
See, e. (]., A. Bromberg, Securities Law : Fraud-SECRule lOb-5 § 8.8, at 221 (1968). While the damages
suffered by purchasers and sellers pursuing a § 10 (b)
cause of action may on occasion be difficult to ascertain,
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, supra, at 155,
in the main such purchasers and sellers at least seek to {
base recovery on a demonstrable number of shares traded.
In contrast, a putative plaintiff, who neither purchases
nOr"Sells secunties but sues instead for mtangible economiC m ur such as loss of a noncontractual opportunity to buy or se , is more 1 e y to e see mg a
largely conjectural and speculative recovery in which
tile numb'er of Sliares 'irivolved Will depend on the plaintiff's subjective hypothesis. Cf. Estate Counseling Service v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 303 F. 2d
527, 533 (CAlO 1962); Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F. 2d
328, 335 (CA2 1911) ; Wolf v. Frank, 477 F. 2d 467, 478
(CA2 1973) .
One of the justifications advanced for implication of
a cause of action under § 10 (b) lies in § 29 (b) of the
1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78cc, providing that a contract
cause of action. Compare Greater Iowa Corp . v. McLendon, 378
F . 2d 783, 788, 791 (CA8 1967), w1th Ftshman v. Raytheon Mfg.
Corp., 188 F. 2d 783, 787 (CA2 1951) See, e. g., SEC v. Texa8
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F . 2d 833, 867 (CA2 1968) (Opinion of
Friendly, J., conrurring), cert. demed, 394 U S. 976 (1969) ; 3
L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1785 (1961 ) .
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made in violation of any provision of the 1934 Act is
voidable at the option of the deceived party. 6 See, e. g.,
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co ., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514
(ED Pa. 194~); Slavin v. Germantown Fire Insurance Co., 174 F. 2d 799, 815 (CA3 1949); Fischman v.
Raytheon Manufa.cturing Co., 188 F. 2d 783, 787
n. 4 (CA2 1951); A. Bromberg, Securities Regulation:
Fraud-SEC Rule 10b-5 § 2.4 (l)(b) (1968) . But that
justification is absent when there is no actual purchase
or sale of securities, or a contract to do so, affected or
tainted by a violation of § 10 (b) . Cf. Mount Clemens
Industries, Inc. v. Bell, supra.
The principal express nonderivative private civil remedies, created by Congr~ss contemporaneously with the
passage of § 10 (b), for violations of various provisions
of the 1933 and 1934 Acts are by their terms expressly
limited to purchasers or sellers of securities. Thus
§ 11 (a) of the 1933 Act confines the cause of action it
grants to "any person acquiring the secul'ity" while the
remedy granted by § 12 of that Act is limited to the
"person purchasing the said security." Section 9 of the
§ 29 (b) of the 1934 Act provide in part :
Every contract made in violation of any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, and every contract
(including any contratt for listing a security on an exchange) here~
tofore or hereafter made, the performance of which involves the
violation of, or the continuance of any relationship or practice in
violation of, any provision of this chapter or any rule or regulation
thereunder, shall be void, (I) as regards the rights of any person
who, in violation of any such provision, rule, or regulation, shall
ltave made or engaged in the performance of any such contract, and
(2) as regards the rights of any person who, not being a party to
such contract, shall have acquired any right thereunder with actual
knowledge of the facts by reason of which the making or performance of such contract was in violation of any such provision, rule,
or regulation. . • ."
Cf. Decker v. Independent Shares Corp ., 311 U. S. 282 (1940).
8

44

''·
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1934 Act, prohibiting a variety of fraudulent and manipulative devices, limits the express civil remedy provided
for its violation to "any person who shall purchase or
sell any security" in a transaction affected by a violation
of the provision. Section 18 of the 1934 Act, prohibiting false or misleading statements in reports or other
documents required to be filed by the 1934 Act, limits
the express remedy provided for its violation to "any
person ... who ... shall have purchased or sold a security at a price which was affected by such statement ...."
It would indeed be anomalous to impute to Congress an
intention to expand the plaintiff class for a judicially
implied cause of action beyond the bounds it delineated
for comparable express causes of action.
·Having said all this, we would by no means be understood as suggesting that we are able to divine any express or even clearly implied "intent of Congress" in
determining whether a claim under Rule 10b-5 should
be limited to purchasers and sellers under the Act.
When we deal with private actions under Rule lOb-5,
we deal with a 'udicial oak which has grown from little
uc growth may be
more than a e,gislatlve acor.n.
c(ufte consistent witll the congressional enactment and
with the role of the federal judiciary in interpreting it,
see J. I. Case v. Borak, supra, but it would be disingenuous to suggest that either Congress in 1934 or the
Securities and Exchange Commission in 1942 foreordained the present state of the law with respect to
Rule 10b-5. I is therefore proper that we consider,
in addition to the factors a rea y discussed, what may
be described as policy considerations when we come to
fl~h out the portions of the law with respect to which
neither the congressional enactment nor the administrative regulations offer conclusive guidance.
Three principal classes of potential plaintiffs are pre._
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ently barred by the Birnbaum rule. ~ are
potential purchasers of shares, either in a new offering
or on the Nation's post-distribution trading markets,
who allege that they decided not to purchase because
of an unduly gloomy representation or the omission of
favorable material which made the issuer appear to be a
less favorable investment vehicle than it actually was.
Second are actual shareholders in the issuer who allege
that they decided not to sell their shares because of an
unduly rosy representation or a failure to disclose unfavorable material. Third are shareholders, creditors,
.
and perhaps others related to an Issuer
who suffered loss
in the value of their investment due to corporate or
insider activities in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities which violate Rule 10b-5. It has been held
that shareholder members of the second and third of
these classes may frequently be able to circumvent the
Birnbaum limitation through bringing a derivative action
on behalf of the corporate issuer if the latter is itself a
purchaser or seller of securities. See, e. g., Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, 405 F. 2d 215, 219 (CA2 1968), cert. denied
sub nom. Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U. S. 906 (1969).
Bu·t the first of these classes, of which respondent is a \
member, can not claim the benefit of such a rule.
A great majority of the many commentators on the
issue before us have taken the view that the Birnbaum
limitation on the plaintiff class in a Rule lOb-5 action
for damages is an arbitrary restriction which unreasonably prevents some deserving plaintiffs from recovering damages which have in fact been caused by violations
of Rule lOb-5. See, e. g., Lowenfels, The Demise of the
Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule 10b-5, 54 Va.
Law Rev. 268 (1968) . The Securities and Exchange
Commission has filed an amicus brief in this case espousing that same view. We have no doubt that this is

-
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indeed a disadvantage of the Birnbaum rule,7 and if it
had no countervailing advantages It would be undesirable as a matter of policy, however much it might be
supported by precedent and legislative history. But we
are of the opinion that there are countervailing advantages to the Birnbaum rule, purely as a matter of
policy, although those advantages are more difficult to
articulate than is the disadvantage.
There has been widespread recognition that litigation
under Rule 10b-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness
different in degree and in kind from that which accompanies litigation in general. This fact was recognized
by Judge Browning in his opinion for the majority of
the Court of Appeals in this case, 492 F. 2d 14\, and by
Judge Hufstedler in her dissenting opinion when she
said:
"The purchaser-seller rule has maintained the balances built into the congressional scheme by permitting damage actions to be brought only by those
persons whose active participation in the marketing
transaction promises enforcement of the statute
without undue risk of abuse of the litigation process
and without distorting the securities market." 492
F. 2d 147.
Obviously this disadvantage is <1ttenuatcd to the extent that
remedies are available to nonpurchasers and nonsellers under state
law. Cf. § 28 of the Secunties Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C.
§ 78bb. See Iroquois Industries, Inc v. Syracuse China Corp., 417
F . 2d 963, 969 (CA2 1969), cert. denied, 399 U. S. 909 (1970) .
Thus for example in Birnbaum 1tself, while the plaintiffs found
themselves w1thout federal remedies, the conduct alleged as the·
gravamen of the federal complaint later provided the basis for·
recovery in a cause of action based on state law See 3 L. Loss,
Securities Regulation 1469 (1961) . And in the immediate case,.
respondent has filed a state court class act10n held in abeyancepending the outcome of this suit. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip·
Stamps, No , C-51352. (Superioi: Cou:rt. Co.unty of Los Angeles, Cal.).
7

I
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Judge Friendly in commenting on another aspect of
Rule 10b-5 litigation has referred to the possibility that
unduly expansive imposition of civil liability "will lead
to large judgments, payable in the last analysis by innocent investors, for the benefit of speculators and their
lawyers .... " SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d
833, 867 (CA2 1968) (concurring opinion). See also
Boone and McGowan, Standing to Sue under Rule 10b-5,
49 Tex. L. Rev. 617, 648-649 (1971).
We believe that the concern expressed for the danger
of vexatious litigation which could result from a widely
expanded class of plaintiffs under Rule 10b-5 is founded
in something more substantial than the common com- ,
plaint of the many defendants who would prefer avoiding
lawsuits entirely to either settling them or trying them.
These concerns have two largely separate grounds.
The first of these concerns is that in the field of corporate law even a complaint which by objective standards may have very little chance of success at trial has a
settlement value to the plaintiff out of any proportion to
its prospect of success at trial so long as he may prevent
the suit from being resolved against him by dismissal or
summary judgment. The very pendency of the lawsuit
may frustrate or delay normal business activity of the
defendant which is totally unrelated to the lawsuit.
See, e. g., Sargent, The SEC and the Individual Investor :
Restoring His Confidence in the Market, 60 Va. L. Rev.
533, 562-572 (1974); Dooley, The Effects of Civil Liability on Investment Banking and the New Issues Market, 58 Va. L. Rev. 777, 822-843 (1972) .
Congress itself recognized the potential for nuisance
or "strike" suits in this type of litigation, and in the 1934
Act amended § 11 of the 1933 Act to provide that :
" In any suit under this or any other section of this
Title the Court may, in its discretion, require an
undertaking for the payment of the costs of such

~
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suit, including reasonable attorneys' fees ...." ( 48
Stat. 881, 908.)
Senator Fletcher, Chairman of the Senate Banking and
Finance Committee, in introducing Title II of the 1934
Act on the floor of the Senate, stated in explaining the
amendment to § 11 (e) that "[t]his amendment is the
most important of all." 78 Cong. Rec. 8669. Among
its purposes was to provide "a defense against blackmail
suits." Ibid.
Where Congress in those sections of the 1933 Act
which expressly conferred a private cause of action for
damages, adopted a provision uniformly regarded as designed to deter "strike" or nuisance actions, Cohen v.
Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 548-549, that fact
alone justifies our consideration of such potential in determining the limits of the class of plaintiffs who may
sue in an action wholly implied from the language of the
1934 Act.
The potential for possible abuse cf the liberal dis- ~
covery provisions of the federal rules may likewise exist
in this type of case to a greater extent than they do in
other litigation. The prospect of extensive deposition of
the defendant's officers and associates and the concomitant opportunity for exte~nsive discovery of business documents, is a common occurrence in this and similar types
of litigatiOn. To the extent that this process eventually
produces relevant evidence which is useful in determining
the merits of the claims asserted by the parties, it bears
the imprimatur of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and of the many cases liberally interpreting them. But
to the extent that It permits a plaintiff with a largely
groundless claim to simply take up the time of a number
of other people. ;ith the right to do so representing an
in terrorem increment of the settlement value, rathet·
than a reasonably founded hope that the process will
reveal relevant evidence. it is a social cost rather than a

1
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benefit. Yet to broadly expand the class of plaintiffs
who may sue under Rule lOb-5 would appear to encourage the least appealing aspect of the use of the discovery
rules.
Without the Birnbaum rule, an action under § lOb-5
will turn largely on which oral version of a series of occurrences the jury may decide to credit, and therefore no
matter how improbable the allegations of the plaintiff,
the case will be virtually impossible to dispose of prior
to trial other than by settlement. In the words of Judge
Hufstedler's dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals:
"The great ease with which plaintiffs can allege the
requirements for the majority's standing rule and
the greater difficulty that plaintiffs are going to have
proving the allegations suggests that the majority's
rule will allow a relatively high proportion of 'bad'
cases into court. The risk of strike suits is particu- ,
larly high in such cases; although they are difficult
to prove at trial, they are even more difficult to dispose of before trial." 492 F . 2d, at 147 n. 9.
The Birnbaum rule, on the other hand, permits exclusion prior to trial of those plaintiffs who were not
themselves purchasers or sellers of the stock in question.
The fact of pur~hase of stock and the fact of sale of
stock are generally matters which are verifiable by documentation, and do not depend upon oral recollection, so
that failure to qualify under the Birnbaum rule is a matter that can normally be established by the defendant
either on a motion to dismiss or on a motion for summary judgment.
Obviously there is no general legal principle that courts
in fashioning substantive law should do so in a manner
which makes it easier, rather than more difficult, for a
defendant to obtain a summary judgment. But in this
type of litigation, where the mere existence of an un-
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resolved lawsuit has settlement value to the plaintiff not
only because of the possibility that he may prevail on
the merits, an entirely legitimate component of settlement value, but because of the threat of extensive discovery and disruption of normal business activities
which may accompany a lawsuit which is groundless in any event, but cannot be proven so before trial,
such a factor is not to be totally dismissed. The Birnbaum rule undoubtedly excludes plaintiffs who have in
fact been damaged by violations of Rule lOb-5, and to
that extent it is undesirable. But it also separates in a
readily demonstrable manner the group of plaintiffs who
actually purchased or actually sold, and whose version
of the facts is therefore more likely to be believed by
the trier of fact, from the vastly larger world of potential
plaintiffs who might successfully allege a claim but could
seldom succeed in proving it, And this fact is one of its
advantages.
The second ground for fear of vexatious litigation is
based on the coucern that, given the generalized contours
of liability, the abolition of the Birnbaum rule would
throw open to the trier of fact many rather hazy issues
of historical fact the proof of which depended almost
entirely on oral testimony. We in no way disparage the \
worth and frequent high value of oral testimony when
we say that dangers of its abuse appear to exist in this
type of action to a peculiarly high degree. The brief
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, while opposing the adoption of the Birnbaum rule by this Court,
states that it agrees with petitioners "that the effect, if
any, of a deceptive practice on someone who has neither
purchased nor sold securities may be more difficult to
demonstrate than is the effect on a purchaser or seller."
Brief,· pp. 24-25. The brief also points out that frivolous suits can be brought whatever the rules of standing,
and reminds us of t,his Court's recognition "in a different
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context" that "the expense and annoyance of litigation is
'part of the social burden of living under government.'"
Petroleum Exploratwn, Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n,
304 U. S. 209, 222. The Commission suggests that in
particular cases additional requirements of corroboration
of testimony and more limited measure of damages
would correct the dange1s of an expanded class of
plaintiffs.
But the very necessity, or R.t least the desirability,
of fashioning unique rules of corroboration and damages
as a correlative to the abolition of the Birnbaum rule
suggests that the rule itself may have something to be
said for it.
In considering the policy underlying the Birnbaum
rule, it is not inappropriate to advert briefly to the tort
of misrepresentation and deceit, to which a claim under
§ lOb-5 certainly has some relationship. Originally
under the common law of England such an action was
not available to one other than a pRrty to a business
transaction. That limitation was eliminated in Pasley
v. Freeman, 3 Term Rep. 51, 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (1789).
Under the earlier law the misrepresentation was generally
required to be one of fact, rather than opinion, but that
requirement, too, was gradually relaxed. Lord Bowen's
famous comment in Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, that "the
state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his
digestion," 1882, L. R. 29 Ch. Div. 359, suggests that this
distinction, too, may have been somewhat arbitrary.
And it has long been established in the ordinary case of
deceit that a misrepresentation which leads to a refusal
to purchase or to sell is actionable in just the same way
as a representation which leads to the consummation of
a purchase or sale. Butler v. Watkins, 9 Wall. 815
( 1871) . These aspects of the evolution of the tort of
deceit and misrepresentation suggest a direction away
from rules such as B·irnbaum,

'
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But the typical fact situation in which the classic tort
of misrepresentatiOn and deceit evolved was light years
away from the world of commercial transactions to which
Rule l Ob-5 is applicable. The plaintiff in Butler, supra,
for example, claimed that he had held off the market a
patented machine for tying cotton bales which he had
developed by reason of the fraudulent representations of
the defendant. But the report of the case leaves no
doubt that the plaintiff and defendant met zi&._ one
another in New Orleans, that one presented a draft agreement to the other, and that letters were exchanged
relating to that agreement. Although the claim to damages was based on an allegedly fraudulently induced
decision not to put the machines on the market, the plaintiff and the defendant had concededly been engaged in
the course of business dealings with one another, and
would presumably have recognized one another on the
street had they met.
In today's universe of transactions governed by the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 12rivity of dealing or
even personal contact between potential defendant and
potential plaintiff is the except.ion and not the rule. The
stock of issuers is listed on financial exchanges utilized by
tens of millions of investors and corporate representations reach a potential audience, encompassing not only
the diligent few who peruse filed corporate reports or the
sizable number of subscribers to financial journals, but
the readership of the Nation's daily newspapers. Obviously neither the fact that issuers or other potential defendants under Rule lOb-5 reach a large number of potential investors, or the fact that they are required by
law to make their disclosures conform to certain standards, should m any way absolve them from liability for
misconduct which 1s proscribed by Rule lOb-5.
But in the absence of the Birnbaum rule, it would be
sufficient for a plaintiff to prove that he had failed to
purchase or sell stock by reason of a defendant's violation
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of Rule lOb-5. The manner in which the defendant's
violation caused the plaintiff to fail to act could be as a
result of the reading of a prospectus, as respondent claims
here, but it could just as easily come as a result of a
claimed reading of information contained in the financial
pages of a local newspaper. Plaintiff'f? proof wo!!,ld not
be that he purchased or sold stock, a fact which would be
capable of documentary verification in most situations,
but instead that he decide not
purchase or sell stock.
Plaintiff's entire testimony could be epen ent upon un~
corroborated oral evidence of many of the crucial ele~
ments of his claim, and still be sufficient to go to the
jury. The jury would not even have the benefit of
weighing the plaintiffs version against the defendant's
version, since the elements to which the plaintiff would
testify would be in many cases totally unknown and unknowable to the defendant. The very real risk in permitting those in respondent's position to sue under Rule
lOb-5 is that the door will be open to recovery of substantial damages on the part of one who offers only his
own testimony to prove that he ever consulted a
prospectus of the issuer, that he paid any attention to it,
or that the representations contained in it damaged him.8
8 The SEC, recognizing the necessity for limitations on nonpurchaser, nonseller plain1iffs in the absence of the Birnbaum rule,
suggests two such limitations to mitiga.te the practical adverse
effects flowing from abolition of the rule. First it suggests requiring some corroborative evidence in addition to oral testimony
tending to show that the mvestment decision decision of a plaintiff
was affected by an omission or misrepresentation. SEC Brief, at
25-26. Apparently ownership of stock or receipt of a prospectus
or press release would bP. sufficient corroborative evidence in the
view of the SEC to reach the jury. We do not believe that such
a requirement would adequately respond to the concerns in part
underlying the Birnbaum rulP.. Ownership of stock or receipt of a
prospectus says little about whether a plaintiff's investment decision
was affected by a violatwn of Rule lOb-5 or whether a decision
was even made. Second, the SEC would limit the vicarious liability
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The virtue of the Birnbaum rule, simply stated, in this
situation, is that it litmts the class of plaintiffs to those
who have at least dealt m the security to which the
prospectus, representation, or omission relates. And
their dealing in the security, whether by way of purchase
or sale, will generally be an objectively demonstrable
fact in an are11. of the law otherwise very much de
pendent upon oral testimony. As Judge Hufstedler said
dissenting from the majority's opinion for the Court of
Appeals in this case :
"The passive investor could always await market
developments without any risk, claiming deception
caused non-buying if the value of the securities
proved more promising than the offeror's glum predictions and deception caueed nonselling if a rosier
prospectus was followed by a market decline. Meanwhile securities offercrs would be hard pressed to
find language for prospectuses that would be suffi:..
c1ently neutral to avoid potenti91 damage suits
from bystanders." 492 F. 2d, at 148.
While much of the development of the law of deceit
of corporatl' issuers to nonpurcha~ers and nonsellers to situations
where the corporate Issuer has been unjustly enriched by a violation.
We have no occasion to pass upon the compat ibility of this limitation with § 20 (a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U S. C. § 78t (a) . We do
not believe that this proposed limitation is relevant to the concerns
underlying in part the Birnbaum rule as we have expressed them.
We are not alone in feeling that the limitations proposed by the
SEC are not adequate to deal with the adverse effects which would
flow from abolition of the Bzrnbaum rule. See, e. g., Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F. 2d 627, 636 (CA2), cert. denied, 389
U S. 970 (1967) ; lroquozs Industries Inc . v. Syracu.se China Corp.,
417 F. 2d 963, 967 (CA2 1969), cert. denied, 399 U. S. 909 (1970) ;
Rekant v. Desser, 425 F. 2d 872, 879 (CA5 1970); GAF Co.rp v.
M ilstem, 453 F . 2d 709, 721 ( CA2 1971) , cert. denied, 406 U. S.
910 (1972) ; Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F. 2d 722, 736, 738 (CA2
1972) (in bane); Mount Clements lndu.stries, Inc" v. Bell, 464 F.
2d 339, 341 (CA9 1972)
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has been the elimination of artificial barriers to recovery
on just claims, we are not the first court to express concern that the inexorable broadening of the class of plaintiff who may sue in this area of the law will ultimately
result in more harm than good. In Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441, Chief Judge
Cardozo observed with respect to "a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class" that :
"The hazards of a business conducted on these terms
are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw
may not exist in the implication of the duty that
exposes to these consequences." 174 N. E., at 444.
In Herpich v. Wa!lace, 430 F. 2d 792, 804-805 (CA5
1970), a case adopting the Birnbaum limitation on the
class of plaintiffs who might bring an action for damages
based on a violation of Rule lOb-5, Judge Ainsworth '
expressed concern similar to those expressed by Chief
Judge Cardozo. Judge Stevens, writing in Eason v.
General Motors Acceptance Corp., CA7, 490 F. 2d 654,
stated that court's view that these concerns were unduly emphasized, and went on to say that "We may not
for that reason reject what we believe to be a correct
interpretation of the statute or the rule." 490 F. 2d, at
660. He relied in part on the view that Rule lOb-5
should be interpreted, in keeping with this Court's repeated admonition, "not technically and restrictively,
but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes." Affi-liated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S. 128, 151
(1972).
We quite agree that if CoPgress had legislated the
elements of a private cause of action for damages, the
duty of the Judicial Branch would be to administer the
law which Congress enacted; the j11diciary may not circumscribe a right which Congress has conferred because
of any disagreement it might have with Congress about
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the wisdom of creating so expansive a liability. But as (
we have pointed out, we are not dealing here with the
interpretation of the express language of § lOb or of
Rule lOb-5 conferring a private cause of action. N·o
Ian ua e in either of those provisions speaks at all to the'
contours o a nrivate cause o ac wn or t eir violation.
However fl";xibly we may construe the language of both
provisions, nothing in such construction militates against
the Birnbaum rule. We are dealing with a private cause
of action which has been judicially found to exist, and
which will have to be judicially delimited one way or
another unless and until Congress addresses the question. Given the peculiar blend of legislative, administrative, and judicial history which now surrcunds Rule
lOb-5, we believe that practical factors to wh~ch we have
adverted, and to which other courts have referred, ~re
entitled to a good deal of weight.
Thus we conclude that what may be called considerations of policy, which ~ are free to weigh in deciding
this case, are by no means entirely on one side or the
scale. Taken together with the precedental support for
theBirnbaum rule over a period of more than 20 years,
and the consistency of that rule with what we can glean
from the intent of Congress, they lead us to conclude
that it is a sound rule and should be followed,

IV
The majority of the Court of Appeals in this case
expressed no disagreement with the general proposition
that one asserting a claim for damages based on the violation of Rule lOb-5 must be either a purchaser or seller
of securities. However, it noted that prior cases have
held that persons owning contractual rights to buy or
sell securities are not excluded by the Birnbaum rule.
Relying on these cases, it' concluded that respond~
ent's status as an offeree pursuant to the terms of the
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consent decree served the same function, for purposes
of delimiting the class of plaintiffs, as is normally performed by the requirement of a contractual relationship.
492 F. 2d, at 142.
The Court of Appeals recognized, and respondent concedes here, 0 tha.t a well-settled line of authority from
this Court establishes that a consent decree is not en- (.
forceable directly or in collateral proceedings by those
who are not parties to it even though they were intended
to be benefited by it. United States v. Armour and Co·.,
402 U. S. 673 (1971); Buckeye Co. v. Hocking Valley
Co., 269 U. S. 42 (1925). 10
A contract to purchase or sell securities is expressly
defined by§ 3 (a.) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S. C.§ 78c (a),u
as a purchase or sale of securities for the purposes of that
Act. Unlike respondent, who had no contractual right
or duty to purchase Blue Chip's securities, the holders of
puts, calls, options and other contractual rights or duties
to purchase .or sell securities have been recognized as
"purchasers" or "sellers" of securities for purposes of
Rule 10b-5, not because of a judicial conclusion that
they were similarly situated to "purchasers" or "sellers/'
but because the definitional provisions of the 1934 Act
themselves grant them such a status.
Even if we were to accept the notion that the Birn,..
See Respondent's Brief, at 60.
See n. 1, supra; 492 F. 2d, at 144 n. 3 (Opinion of Hufstedler,
J., dissenting).
11 Section 3 (a) (13) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78c (a) (13)
provides:
66
The terms 'buy' and 'purchase' each include any contract to buy,
purchase, or otherwise acquire."
Section 3 (a) (14) of t.he 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78c (a) (14)
provides:
1
'The terms 'sale' and 'sell' e.ach incl~de any contJact tp sell ~J
0

10

otherwise dispose of."
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baum rule could be circumvented on a case-by-case basis
through particularized judicial inquiry into the facts surrounding a complaint, this respondent and the members
of his alleged class would be unlikely candidates for such
a judicially created exception. While the Birnbaum
rule has been flexibly interpreted by lower federal
courts, 12 we have been unable to locate a single decided
case from any court in the 20-odd years of litigation
since the Birnbaum decision which would support the
right of persons who were in the position of respondent
here to bring a private suit under Rule 10b-5. Respondent was not only not a buyer or seller of any security
but it was not even a shareholder of the corporate
petitioners.
As indicated, the 1934 Act, under which respondent
seeks to assert a cause of action, is general in scope but
chiefly concerned \Vith the regulation of post-distribution
trading on the Nation's stock exchanges and securities
trading markets. The 1933 Act is a far narrower statute
chiefly concerned with disclosure and fraud in connection
•with offerings of securities-primarily, as here, initial
distributions of newly issued stock from corporate issuers. 1 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 130-131 (1961).
Respondent, who derives no entitlement from the antitrust consent decree a.nd does not otherwise possess any
contractual rights relating to the offered stock, stands in
the same position as any other disappointed offeree of
a stock offering registered under the 1933 Act who claims
that an overly pessimistic prospectus, prepared and distributed as required by §§ 5, 10 of the 1933 Act, has
caused it to allow its opportunity to purchase to pass.
12

Our decision in SEC v. Nationol Securities, Inc ., 393 U. S. 453
(1969), established thnt the purchaser-seller rule imposes no limitation on the standing of the SEC to bring actions for injunctive
relief under § 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5 .
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There is strong evidence that application of the Birnbaum rule to preclude suit by the disappointed offeree
of a registered 1933 Act offering under Rule lOb-5 furthers the intention of Congress as expressed in the 1933
Act. 18 Congress left little doubt tpat its purpose in
imposing the prospectus and registration requirements:
of the 1933 Act was to prevent "the high pressured salesmanship rather than careful counsel," causing inflated
new issues, through direct limitation by the SEC of "the·
selling arguments hitherto employed." H. R. Rep. No.
85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 2, 8 (1933).
"Any objection that the compulsory incorporation
in selling literature and sales argument of substantially all information concerning the issue, will
frighten the buyer with the intricacy of the transaction states one of the best arguments for the provision." ld., at 8.
The SEC, in accord with the congressional purposes, spe-·
cifically requires prominent emphasis be given in filed
registration statements and prospectuses to material adverse contingencies. See, e. g., SEC Securities Act Release No. 4936, Guides for the Preparation and Filing of
Registration Statements, p. 6, ,-r 6 (1968); Universal
Camera Corp., 19 S. E. C. 648, 654-656 (1945); Wheat
and Blackstone, Guideposts for a First Public Offering,.
15 Bus. Lawyer 539, 560-562 (1960).
u Blue Chip did not here present the question of whether an·
implied action under § 10 (b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 will
lie for actions made 1.1 violation of the 1933 Act and the subject
of express civil remedies under th':l 1933 Act. We therefore have
no occasion to pass on this issue. Compare Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Cm·p., 80 F. Supp. 123 (ED Pa. 1948), with Thiele v. Shields,
131 F. Supp. 416 (SDNY 1955) . Cf. 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1787-1791 (1961) ; 6 L. Loss, Securities Regulation, at 39153917 (1969); A. Bromberg, Securities La.w : Fra.ud-Rule lOb-5,
§24 (2)

(19B8) ~
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Sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act provide express
civil remedies for misrepresentations and omissions in
registration statements and prospectuses filed under the
Act, as here charged, but restrict recovery to the offering
price of shares actually purchased :
"To impose a greater responsibility WOllld unnecessarily restrain the conscientious administration of
honest business with no compensating advantage
to the public." H . R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess., 9 (1933) .
And in Title II of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
48 Stat. 905-908, the same act adopting § 10 (b), Congress amended § 11 of the 1933 Act to limit still further
the express civil remedy it conferred. See generally
James, Amendments to the Securities Act of 1933, 32
Mich. L. Rev. 1130, 1134 (1934). The additional congressional restrictions, contained in Title II of the 1934
Act, on the already limited express civil remedies provided by the 1933 Act for misrepresentations or omissions in a registration statement or prospectus reflected
congressional concern over the impact of even these
limited remedies on the new issues market. 78 Cong.
Rec. 8668-8669. There is thus ample evidence that
Congress did not intend to extend a private cause of
action for money damages to the nonpurchasing offeree
of a stock offering registered under the 1933 Act for loss
of the opportunity to purchase due to an overly pessimistic prospectus.
Beyond the difficulties evident in an ~xtension of
standing to this respondent, we do not believe that the
Birnbaum rule is merely a shorthand judgment on the
nature of a particular plaintiff's proof. As a purely
practical matter, it is doubtless true that respondent and
the members of its class, as offerees and recipients of the
prospectus of New Blue Chip, are a smaller class of
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potential plaintiffs than would be all those who might
conceivably assert that they obtained information violative of Rule lOb-5 and attributable to the issuer in the
financial pages of their local newspaper. And since respondent likewise had a prior connection with some of
petitioners as a result of using the trading stamps marketed by Old Blue Chip, and was intended to benefit
from the provisions of the consent decree, there is doubtless more likelihood that its managers read and were
damaged by the allegedly misleading statements in the
prospectus than there would be in a case filed by a complete stranger to the corporation.
But respondents and the members of their class are
neither "purchasers" nor "sellers," as those terms are
defined in the 1934 Act, and therefore to the extent that
their claim of standing to sue were recognized, it would
mean that the lesser practiral difficulties of corroborating
at least some elements of their proof would be regarded
as sufficient to avoid the Birnbaum rule. While we have
noted that these practical difficulties, particularly in the
case of a complete stranger to the corporation, support
the retention of that rule, they are by no means the only
factor which does so. The general adoption of the rule
by other federal courts in the 20·odd years since it was
pronounced, and the consistency of the rule with the
statutes involved and their legislative history, are likewise bases for retaining the rule. Were we to agree with
the Court of Appeals m this case, we would leave the
Btrnbaum rule open to endless case-by-case erosion depending on whether a particular group of plaintiffs were
thought by the court in which the issue was being litigated to be sufficiently more discrete tha.n the world of
potential purchasers at large to JUstify an excep~
tiou We do not believe that such a shifting and highly
fact-oriented disposition of the Issue of who may bring

~
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a damage claim for violation of Rule lOb-5 is a satisf~c
tory basis for a rule of liability imposed on the conduct
of business transactions. Nor is it as consistent as a
straightforward application of the Birnbq,um rule with
the other factors which support the retention of that
rule. We therefore hold that respondent was not entitled to sue for violation ~f Rule lOJ:>--5, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Reversed.
MR. JusTICE DouGLAS took no part in the consideration
or decision of this case.
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MR. JusTrcm PowELL, concurring.
Although I concur in the opinion of the Court, I write
to emphasize the significance of the texts of the Acts of
1933 and 1934 and especially the language of § 10 (b)
and Rule 10b-5.
The starting point in every case involving construction
of a statute is the language itself. The critical phrase
in both the statute and the Rule is "in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security." 15 U. S. C. § 78j
(b); 17 CFR § 240.10b- 5 (italics added). Section 3a
(14) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S. C. § 78o (a) (14), provides
that the term "sale" shall "include any contract to sell
or otherwise dispose of" securities. There is no hint in
any provision of the Act that the term "sale," as used
in § 10 (b) , was intended- in addition to its longestablished legal meaning- to include an "offer to sell."
Respondent, nevertheless, would have us amend the controlling language in § 10 (b) to read:
" ... in connection with the purchase or sale of, or
an offer to sell, any security."
Before a court properly could consider taking such liberty
with statutory language there should be, at least, unmistakable support in the history and structure of the legislation. None exists in this case.
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Nothing in the history of the Securities Acts supports
any congressional intent to include mere offers in § 10 (b).
Moreover, as the Court's opinion indicates, impressive
extrinsic evidence in the texts of the two Acts indicates
clearly that Congress selectively and carefully distinguished between offers, purchases and sales. Section
17 (a), the antifraud provision of the 1933 Act, 15
U. S. C. § 779 (a) , for example, expressly includes
"offer [s]" of securities within its terms while § 10 (b)
and Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act do not. The 1933 Act
also defines "offer to sell" as something distinct from a
sale. § 2 (3) , 15 U. S. C. § 77b (3).
If further evidence of congressional intent were needed,
it may be found in the subsequent history of these Acts.
As noted in the Court's opinion, the Securities and Exchange Commission unsuccessfully sought, in 1957 and
again in 1959, to persuade Congress to broaden § 10 (b)
by adding to the critical language: "or any attempt to
purchase or sell" any security. See ante, p. 8.
This case involves no "purchase or sale" of securities?
Respondents were mere offerees, who instituted this suit
some two years after the shares were issued and after
the market price had soared. Having "missed the market" on a stock, they arc hardly in a unique position.
'The capital that fuels our enterprise system comes from
investors who have frequent opportunities to purchase,
or not to purchase, securities being offered publicly. The
market prices of new issues rarely remain static: almost
invariably they go up or down, and they often fluctuate
1
It is argued that the language "in connection with" justifies
extending § 10 (b) to include offers which necessarily precede a
purchase or sale. The short answer is that the statute requires a
purchase or a sale of a security, and no offer was made to respondents in connection with either. Their complaint rests upon the
absence of a sale to or purchase by them.
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widely in market appraisal over a period far less than
the two years during which respondents reflected on their
lost opportunity. Most investors have unhappy memories of decisions not to buy stocks which later performed
well.
The opinion of the Court, and the dissenting opinion
of Judge Hufstedler in the Court of Appeals, correctly
emphasize the subjective nature of the inevitable inquiry
if the term "offer" were read into the Act and some arguable error could be found in an offering prospectus:
"Would I have purchased this particular security at the
time it was offered if I had known the correct facts?';
Apart from the human temptation for the plaintiff to
answer this question in a self-serving fashion, the offeror
of the sec~rities-defendant in the suit-is severely
handicapped in challenging the predictable testimony.~~
The subjective issues would be even more speculative in
the class actions that inevitably would follow if we held
that offers to sell securities are covered by § 10 (b) and
Rule lOb-5.
In this case respondents were clearly identifiable as
offerees, as here the shares were offered to designated
persons. 3 In the more customary public sale of securi·2 Proving, after the fact, what "one would have done" encompasses a number of conjectural as well as subjective issues: would
tho offeree have bought at all; how many shares would he have
bought; how long would he have held the shares; were there other
"buys" on the market at the time that they may have been more
attractive even had the offeree known the facts; did he in fact use
his available funds (if any) more advantageously by purchasing
something else.
3
It is argued that the special facts of this case justify extending
tho benefit of § lOb-5 to these respondents, even if the statute
ordinarily requires a purchase or a sale. But this resolution also
would require judicial extension of the terms of the statute. The
mere fact that securities are offered to a limited class of offerees
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ties, identification of those who in fact were bona fide
offerees would present severe problems of proof. The
law requires that offers to sell registered securities be
made by means of an effective prospectus. § 5 (b), 15
U. S. C. § 77 (e) (b). Issues are usually marketed
through underwriters and dealers, often including scores
of investment banking and brokerage firms across the
country. Copies of the prospectus may be widely distributed through the dealer group, and then passed handto-hand among countless persons whose identities cannot be known. If § 10 (b) were extended to embrace
offers to sell, the number of persons claiming to have been
offerees could be legion with respect to a security which
subsequently proved to be a, rewarding investment.
We are entitled to assume that the Congress, in enacting§ 10 (b) and in subsequently declining to extend it,
took into account these and similar considerations. The
courts already have inferred a private cause of action
that was not authorized by the legislation. In doing
this, however, it was unnecessary to rewrite the precise
'language of § 10 (b) and Rule 10b- 5. This is precisely
what respondents- joined, surprisingly, by the SECsought in this case.4 If such a far-reaching change is to
may eliminate some of the problems of proof but it does not avoid
the fatal objection that no offer of securities, absent a purchase or
sitle, is covered by the statute.
4 It is more than curious that tho SEC should seek this change
in the 1934 Act by judicial action. The underlying philosophy of
the 1933 Act was to promote "truth" in the marketing of securities
to the public. The evil was the tendency of the seller to exaggerate,
to "puff','' and sometimes fraudulently to overstate the prospects and
earing capabilities of tho issuing corporation. The decade of the
' 1920's was marked by financings in which the buying public was
oversold, if not actually misled, by the buoyant optimism of issuers
·and underwriters. The 1933 Act was intended to compel moderation
:and caution in selling prospectuses, and this is precisely the way that
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be made, with unpredictable consequences upon the
process of raising capital so necessary to our economic
w~ll-being, it is a matter for the Congress, not the courts.

Act has been administered by the SEC for more than 40 years.
Absolute factual accuracy with respect to a corporate enterprise is
impossible, except with respect to certain hard facts (e. g., some
balance sheet items). The outcome of pending litigation, the effect
of relatively new legislation, the possible enactment of adverse
legislation, the expenditures needed to meet escalating environmental
regulations, the likelihood and effect of new competition or of new
technology and many similar matters of potential relevancy, must be
addressed in registration statements and prospectuses. In administering the 1933 Act, the SEC traditionally and consistently has
encouraged and often required offerors to take conservative postures
in prospectuses, especially with respect to judgmental and unfavorable matters. If a different philosophy now were to be read into
the 1934 Act, inviting litigation for arguably misleacling understatement as well as for overstatement of the issuer's prospects, the
hazard of "going to market"-already not inconsequential-would be
immeasurably increased.

'
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring.
Although I concur in the opinion of the Court, I write
to emphasize the significance of the texts of the Acts of
1933 and 1934 and especially the language of § 10 (b)
and Rule 10b-5.
The starting point in every case involving construction
of a statute is the language itself. The critical phrase
in both the statute and the ftule is "in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security." 15 U. S. C. § 78j
(b); 17 CFR § 240.10b- 5 (italics added). Section 3a
(14) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S. C.§ 78o (a)(14), provides
that the term "sale" shall "include any contract to sell
or otherwise dispose of" securities. There is no hint in
any provision of the Act that the term "sale," as used
in § 10 (b) , was intended-in addition to its longestablished legal meaning- to include an "offer to sell."
Respondent, nevertheless, would have us amend the controlling language in § 10 (b) to read:
". . . in connection with the purchase or sale of, or
an offer to sell, any security."
Before a court properly could consider taking such liberty
with statutory language there should be, at least, unmistakable support in the history and structure of the legislation. None exists in this case.
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Nothing in the history of the Securities Acts supports
any congressional intent to include mere offers in § 10 (b).
Moreover, as the Court's opinion indicates, impressive
extrinsic evidence in the texts of the two Acts indicates
clearly that Congress selectively and carefully distinguished between offers, purchases and sales. Be~
17 (a) , the antifraud provision of the 1933 Act, 15
U. S. C. § 77 (a), -i9r emultpl~ expressly includes
"offer[s]" o securities within its terms while § 10 (b)
_,_, and Rule 10b- 5 sf the 19iH Ae~do not. The 1933 Act
also defines "offer to sell" as something distinct from a
sale. § 2 (3) , 15 U. S. C. § 77b (3).
If further evidence of congressional intent were needed,
it may be found in the subsequent history of these Acts.
As noted in the Court's opinion, the Securities and Ex·change Commission unsuccessfully sought, in J957 and
again in 1959, to persuade Congress to broaden § 10 (b)
by adding to the critical language: "or any attempt to
purchase or sell" any security. See ante, p. 8.
This case involves no "purchase or sale" of securities?
Respondents were mere offerees, who instituted this suit
some two years after the shares were issued and after
the market price had soared. Having "missed the market" on a stock, they are hardly in a unique position.
· The capital that fuels our enterprise system comes from
·investors who have frequent opportunities to purchase,
· or not to purchase, securities being offered publicly. The
market prices of new issues rarely remain static: almost
invariably they go up or down, and they often fluctuate
1. It is argued that the language "in connection with" justifies
extending § 10 (b) to include offers which necessarily precede a
purchase or sale. The short answer is that the statute requires a
purchase or a sale of a security, and no offer was made to respondents in connection with either. Their complaint rests upon the
~ of a sale to or purchase by them.
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:widely i+l 1C8&Fl£et 8/j9f!P&isti.over a period far less than
the two years during which respondents reflected on their
lost opportunity. Most investors have unhappy memories of decisions not to buy stocks which later performed
:well.
The opinion of the Court, and the dissenting opinion
of Judge Hufstedler in the Court of Appeals, correctly
emphasize the subjective nature of the inevitable inquiry
if the term "offer" were read into the Act and some arguable error could be found in an offering prospectus:
"Would I have purchased this particular security at the
time it was offered if I had known the correct facts?"
Apart from the human temptation for the plaintiff to
answer this question in a self-serving fashion, the offeror
of the securities-defendant in the suit-is severely
handicapped in challenging the predictable testimony.21
The subjective issues would be even more speculative in
the class actions that inevitably would follow if we held
that offers to sell securities are covered by § 10 (b) and
Rule lOb-5.
In this case respondents were clearly identifiable as
offerees, as here the shares were offered to designated
persons. 3 In the more customary public sale of securiProving, after the fact, what "one would have done" encompasses a number of conjectural as well as subjective issues: would
the offeree have bought at all; how many shares would he have
bought; how long would he have held the shares; were there other 1
"buys" on the market at the time that ~may have been more_J
attractive even had the offeree known the facts; did he in fact use
his available funds (if any) more advantageously by purchasing
something else.
3 It is argued that the special facts of this case justify extending
the benefit of § lOb-5 to these respondents, even if the statute
ordinarily requires a purchase or a sale. But this resolution also
would require judicial extension of the terms of the statute. The
mere fact that securities are offered to a limited class of offerees
2
·
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ties, identification of those who in fact were bona fide
offerees would present severe problems of proof. The
~requires that offers to sell registered securities be.J
made by means of an effective prospectus. § 5 (b), 15
U. S. C. § 77 (e) (b). Issues are usually marketed
through underwriters and dealers, often including scores
of investment banking and brokerage firms across the
country. Copies of the prospectus may be widely distributed through the dealer group, and then passed handto-hand among countless persons whose identities cannot be known. If § 10 (b) were extended to embrace
offers to sell, the number of persons claiming to have been d ~
offerees could be legion with respect to security ~
subsequently proved to be a rewarding investment. '{ r 'i~,:at
We are entitled to assume that the Congress, in enactIng § 10 (b) and in subsequently declining to extend it,
took into account these and similar considerations. The
courts already have inferred a private cause of action
that was not authorized by the legislation. In doing
.~his, however, it was unnecessary to rewrite the precise
e~ea !-tlu
language of § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5. This is ~Pe~sel,.;:
..J
what respondents-joined, surprisingly, by the SECsought in this case:1 If such a far-reaching change is to
may eliminate some of the problems of proof but it does not avoid_...---the fatal objection that no offer of securities, absent a purchase or
sale, is covered by the statute.
n IS more than curious that the SEC'Should seek this change
in the 1934 Act by judicial action. The underlying philosophy of
'the 1933 Act was to promote "truth" in the marketing of securities
to the public. The evil was the tendency of the seller to exaggerate, ~
to "puff," and sometimes fraudulently to overstate the prospects and
earing capabilities of the issuing corporation. The decade of the
1920's was marked by financings in which the buying public was
oversold, if not actually misled, by the buoyant optimism of issuers
and underwriters. The 1933 Act was intended to compel moderation
and caution in selling prospectuses, and this is precisely the way that
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be made, with unpredictable consequences upon the
process of raising capital so necessary to our economic
well-being, it is a matter for the Congress, not the courts.
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Act hnrDeen administered by the SEC for more than 40 years.
Absolute factual accuracy with respect to a corporate enterprise is
impossible, except with respect to certain hard facts (e. g., some
balance sheet items). The outcome of pending litigation, the effect
of relatively new legislation, the possible enactment of adverse
legislation, the expenditures needed to meet escalating environmental
regulations, the likelihood and effect of new competition or of new
technology and many similar matters of potential relevancy, must be
addressed in registration statements and prospectuses. In administering the 1933 Act, the SEC traditionally and consistently has
encouraged and often required offerors to take conservative postures
in prospectuses, especially with respect to judgmental and unfavorable matters. If a different philosophy now were to be read into
the 1934 Act, inviting litigation for arguably misleading understatement as well as for overstatement of the issuer's prospects, the
hazard of "going to market"-already not inconsequential-would be
immeasurably increased.
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evil addressed was the tendency of the seller to exaggerate,
to "puff", and sometime s frauduently to overstate the
prospects and earning capabilities of the issuing corporation.
The decade of the 1920's was marked by financings in which
the buying public was oversold, and often misled, by the
bouyant optimism of issuers and underwriters.

The 1933

Act was intended to compel moderation and caution in
prospectuses, and this is precisely the way that Act has
been administered by the SEC for more than 40 years.

Precise

factual accuracy with respect to a corporate enterprise is
frequently impossible, except with respect to
facts.

~ hard

The outcome of pending litigation, the effect of

relatively new legislation, the possible enactment of
adverse legislation, the cost of projected construction
or of entering new markets, the expenditures needed to

2.
meet changing environmental regulations, the likelihood
and effect of new competition or of new technology, and many
similar matters of potential relevancy must be addressed
in registration statements and prospectuses.

In adminis-

tering the 1933 Act, the SEC traditionally and consistently
h a s encouraged and often required offerors to take conservative postures in prospectuses, especially with respect
to judgmental and possibly unfavorable matters.

If a

different philosophy now were to be read into the 1934
Act, inviting litigation for arguably misleading understatement as well as for overstatement of the issuer's prospects,
the hazard of "going to market" - already not inconsequential would be immeasurably increased.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring.
Although I concur in the opinion of the Court, I write
to emphasize the significance of the texts of the Acts of
1933 and 1934 and especially the language of § 10 (b)
and Rule lOb-5.
The starting point in every case involving construction
of a statute is the language itself. The critical phrase
in both the statute and the rule is "in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security." 15 U. S. C. § 78j
(b); 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (italics added). Section 3a
(14) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S. C. § 78o (a) (14), provides
that the term "sale" shall "include any contract to sell
or otherwise dispose of" securities. There is no hint in
any provision of the Act that the term "sale," as used
in § 10 (b), was intended-in addition to its longestablished legal meaning-to include an "offer to sell."
Respondent, nevertheless, would have us amend the controlling language in ~ 10 (b) to read :
" ... in connection with the purchase or sale of, or
an offer to sell, any security."
Before a court properly could consider taking such liberty
with statutory language there should be, at least, unmistakable support in the history and structure of the legisla~iou. NQne exis.ts in this caae.
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Nothing in the history of the Securities Acts supports
any congressional intent to include mere offers in§ 10 (b).
Moreover, as the Court's opinion indicates, impressive
extrinsic evidence in the texts of the two Acts indicates
clearly that Congress selectively and carefully distin·
guished between offers, purchases and sales. For example,
§ 17 (a), the antifraud provision of the 1933 Act, 15
U. S. C. ~ 77q (a), expressly includes "offer[s]" of securities within its terms while § 10 (b) of the 1934 Act and
Rule 10b-5 do not. The 1933 Act also defines "offer to
sell" as something distinct from a sale. § 2 (3), 15
U. S. C. ~ 77b (;3).
If further evidence of cougressional intent were needed,
it may be found in the subsequent history of these Acts.
As noted in the Court's opinion, the Securities and Exchange Commission unsuccessfully sought, in 1957 and
again in 1959, to persuade Congress to broaden § 10 (b)
by adding to the critical language: "or any attempt to
purchase or sell" any security. See ante, p. 8.
This case involves no "purchase or sale" of securities.1
Respondents were mere offerees, who instituted this suit
some two years after the shares were issued and after
the market price had soared. Having "missed the mar·
ket" on a stock, they are hardly in a unique position.
The capital that fuels our enterprise system comes from
investors who have frequent opportunities to purchase,
or not to purchase, securities being offered publicly. The
market prices of new issues rarely remain static: almost
Invariably they go up or down, and they often fluctuate
1 It is argued that the language "in connection with" justifie5
extending § 10 (b) to include offers which necessarily precede a
purchase or sale. The short answer 1s that the statute require:, a
purchase or a sale of a ::;ecurity, and no offer was made to respondents in connection with either. Their complaint rests upon the
absence of a sale to or purchase by them.
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widely over a period far less than the two years during
which respondents reflected on their lost opportunity.
Most investors have unhappy memories of decisions not
to buy stocks which later performed well.
The opinion of the Court, and the dissenting opinion
of Judge Hufstedler in the Court of Appeals, correctly
emphasize the subjective nature of the inevitable inquiry
if the term "offer" were read into the Act and some arguable error could be found in an offering prospectus:
"Would I have purchased this particular security at the
time it was offered if I had known the correct facts?"
Apart from the human temptation for the plaintiff to
answer this question in a self-serving fashion, the offeror
of the securities-defendant in the suit-is severely
handicapped in challenging the predictable testimony.~
The subjective issues would be even more speculative in
the class actions that inevitably would follow if we held
that offers to sell securities are covered by § 10 (b) and
Rule lOb-5.
In this case respondents were clearly identifiable as
offerees, as here the shares were offered to designated
persons. 8 In the more customary public sale of securi2

Proving, after the fact, what "one would have done" encoma number of conjectural as well as subjective issues: would
the offeree have bought at all; how many shares would he have
bought; how long would he have ht>ld the shares; were there·
other "buys" on the market at the time that may have been more
attractive even had the offeree known the facts ; did he in fact use
his available funds (if any) more advantageously by purchasing·
something else.
3 It is argued that the special facts of this case justify extendingthe benefit of § lOb-5 to these respondents, even if the statute
ordinarily requires a purchase or a sale. But this resolution also
would require judicial extension of the terms of the statute. The
mere fact that securities are offered to a limited class of offerees
:may clim.imte SQille of the rro'ble!IliiS llllf proof but it dDes :mot avoi.Ql
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ties, identification of those who in fact were bona fide
offerees would present severe problems of proof. The
1933 Act requires that offers to sell registered securities
be made by means of an effective prospectus. ~ 5 (b), 15
U. S. C. § 77 (e) (b). Issues are usually marketed
through underwriters and dealers. often including scores
of investment banking and brokerage firms across the
country. Copies of the prospectus may be widely distributed through the dealer group, and then passed handto-hand among countless persons whose identities cannot be known. If § 10 (b) were extended to embrace
offers to sell, the number of persons claiming to have been
offerees could be legion with respect to any security that
subsequently proved to be a rewarding investment.
We are entitled to assume that the Congress, in enacting § 10 (b) and in subsequently declining to extend it,
took into account these and similar considerations. The
courts already have inferred a private cause of action
that was not authorized by the legislation. In doing
this . however, it was unnecessary to rewrite the precise
language of§ 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5. This is exactly
what respondents-joined, surprisingly, by the SECsought in this case. 1 If such a far-reaching change is to
the fatal obJection that no offer of Recurities, ab~ent a purchase or
sale, is eoverrd by thr statutr
1 It. i~; more 1han euriou~ 1ha I the SEC should R<.>ek thiR change in
the 1934- Ad by .i\l(lirial artion. The ~Stated purpose of the 1933
Art wa" ''it]o providr full and fair diRclo~ure of the character of
securitir" Hold in intrr~ta1e and forPJgn commPrrc .... " See preamble to Art, 41\ Stat. 74. Thr Pvil addrPssed was the tendency of
the "eller to exaggPrn1 e, to "puff," and ;;omPtimcF< fraudulently to
O\'f'r~tate 1hP pro:;pf'etfl and Parning capabilities of the i~~uing corporution . The dPradc of the 1920's wn:; marhd by financings in
whieh tlw buying pnhlie was oversold, and oftrn misled, by the
bouyant optimi,.;m of is~Uf'l'~ and underwritt'rs. The 1933 Act was
intended to compel moderation and caution in pro~;pcctu~e~:>, and this
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be made, with unpredictable consequences upon the
process of raising capital so necessary to our economic
well-being, it is a matter for the Congress, not the courts.

is precisely the way that Act has been administered by the SEC
for more than 40 years. Precise factual accuracy with respect to
a corporate entrrprise is frequrntly impossible, except with respect
to hard facts . The outcome of pending litigation, the effect of
relatively new legislation, the possiblr enactment of adverse legislation, the cost, of projrctrd construction or of entering new markets,
the expenditures nrrded to meet changing environmental regulations,
the likelihood and effect of new comprtition or of new technology,
and many similar matter~ of potential relevancy must be addressed
in registration statements m1d prospectusPs. In administering the
1933 Act, the SEC traditionally and consistently has encouraged and
often required offerors to take couservative postures in prospectuses,
e>8pecially with rrspect to judgmental and possibly unfavorable·
matters . If a different philosophy now were to be read into the
1934 Act, inviting litigation for arguably misleading understatement
as well as for overstatement of the issurr's prosprcts, the hazard of
"going to market"-alrrady :not inconsequential-would be inunca::rmably iucreru;ed.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring.
Although I concur in th~ opinion of the Court, I write
to emphasize the significance of the texts of the Acts of
1933 and 1934 and especially the language of § 10 (b)
and Rule 10b-5.
I
The starting point in every case involving construction
of a statute is the language itself. The critical phrase
in both the statute and the rule is "in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security." 15 U. S. C. § 78j
(b); 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (italics added). Section 3a
(14) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78c (a) (14), provides }
that the term "sale" shall "include any contract to sell
or otherwise dispose of" securities. There is no hint in
any provision of the Act that the term "sale," as used
in § 10 (b), was intended-in addition to its longestablished legal meaning-to include an "offer to sell."
Respondent, nevertheless, would have us amend the controlling language in § 10 (b) to read :
61
, • • in connection with the purchase or sale of, or
an offer to sell, any security."
Before a court properly could cons1der taking such liberty
with statutory language there should be, at least, unmi~
takable support in the history and structure of the legis~
lation. None exists in this case.
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Nothing in the history of the Securities Acts supports
any congressional intent to include mere offers in § 10 (b) .
Moreover, as the Court's opinion indicates, impressive
extrinsic evidence in the texts of the two Acts indicates
clearly that Congress selectively and carefully distinguished between offers, purchases and sales. For example,
§ 17 (a), the antifraud provision of the 1933 Act, 15
U.S. C.§ 77q (a), expressly includes "offer[s]" of securities within its terms while § 10 (b) of the 1934 Act and
Rule 10b-5 do not. The 1933 Act also defines "offer to
sell" as something distinct from a sale. § 2 (3), 15
u. s. c. § 77b (3).
If further evidence of congressional intent were needed,
it may be found in the subsequent history of these Acts.
As noted in the Court's opinion, the Securities and Exchange Commission unsuccessfully sought, in 1957 and
again in 1959, to persuade Congress to broaden § 10 (b)
by adding to the critical language: "or any attempt to
purchase or sell" any security. See ante, p. 8.
This case involves no "purchase or sale" of securities.1
Respondents were mere offerees, who instituted this suit
some two years after the shares were issued and after
the market price had soared. Having "missed the market" on a stock, they are hardly in a unique position .
. Th~ capital that fuels our enterprise system comes from
investors who have frequent opportunities to purchase,
· or not to purchase, securities being offered publicly. The
market prices of new issues rarely remain static: almost
invariably they go up or down, and they often fluctuate
1 It is argued that the language "in connection with" justifieS'
extending § 10 (b) to include offers which necessanly precede a
purchase or sale. The short answer is that the statute requires a
purchase or a sale of a security, and no offer was made to respond~
ents in connection with either. Their complaint rests upon the
.a,bsence of a sale to or purchase by them.
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widely over a period far less than the two years during
which respondents reflected on their lost opportunity.
Most investors have unhappy memories of decisions not
to buy stocks which later performed well.
The opinion of the Court, and the dissenting opinion
of Judge Hufstedler in the Court of Appeals, correctly
emphasize the suhjective nature of the inevitable inquiry
if the term "offer" were read into the Act and some arguable error could be found in an offering prospectus :
"Would I have purchased this particular security at the
time it was offered if I had known the correct facts?"
Apart from the human temptation for the plaintiff to
answer this question in a self-serving fashion, the offeror
of the securities-defendant in the suit-is severely
handicapped in challenging the predictable testimony.2
The subjective issues would be even more speculative in
the class actions that inevitably would follow if we held
that offers to sell securities are covered by § 10 (b) and
Rule lOb-5.
In this case respondents were clearly identifiable as
offerees, as here the shares were offered to designated
persons. 3 In the more customary public sale of securiProving, after the fact, what "one would have done" encoma number of conjectural as well as subjective issues: would
the offeree have bought at all; how many shares would he have
·bought; how long would 'he have held the shares; were there
•other "buys" on the ma1'ket at the time that may have been more
attractive even had the offeree known the facts; did he in fact use
his available funds (if any) more advantageously by purchasing·
something else.
8 It is argued that the special facts of this case justify extending
the benefit of § lOb-5 to thcsr. respondents, even if the statute
•ordinarily requires a purchase or a sale. But this resolution also
would require judicial extension of the terms of the statute. The
mere fact that secunties are offered to a limited class of offerees·
·may eliminate sonw of the prohlems of proof but it does not avoid
2

pa~ses
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ties, identification of those who in fact were bona fide
offerees would present severe problems of proof. The
1933 Act requires that offers to sell registered securities
be made by means of an effective prospectus. § 5 (b), \
15 U. S. C. § 77e (b). Issues are usually marketed
through underwriters and dealers, often including scores
of investment banking and brokerage firms across the
country. Copies of the prospectus may be widely distributed through the dealer group, and then passed handto-hand among countless persons whose identities cannot be known. If § 10 (b) were extended to embrace
offers to sell, the number of persons claiming to have been
offerees could be legion with respect to any security that,
subsequently proved to be a rewarding investment.
We are entitled to assume that the Congress, in enacting § 10 (b) and in subsequently declining to extend it,
took into account these and similar considerations. The
courts already have inferred a private cause of action
that was not authorized by the legislation. In doing
this, however, it was unnecessary to rewrite the precise
language of § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5. This is exactly
what respondents-joined, surprisingly, by the SECsought in this case:' If such a far-reaching change is to
the fatal objection that no offer of securities, absent a purchase or
sale, is covered by the statute.
4 It is more than curious that ti1e SEC should seek this change in
the 1934 Act by judicial action. The stated purpose of the 1933
Act was "[t]o provide full and fair disclosure of the character of
securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce ...." See preamble to Act, 48 Stat. 74. The evil addressed was the tendency of
the seller to exaggerate, to "puff," and sometimes fraudulently to
overstate the prospects and earning capabilities of the issuing corporation. The decade of the 1920's was marked by financings in
which the buying public was oversold, and often misled, by the
bouyant optimism of issuers and underwriters. The 1933 Act was
intended to compel moderation and caution in prospectuses, and this
is · precisely the way that Act has been administered by the SEC
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be made, with unpredictable consequences for the process of raising capital so necessary to our economic wellbeing, it is a matter for the Congress, not the courts.

II
MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN's dissent charges the Court
with "a preternatural solicitude for corporate well being
and a seeming callousness toward the investing public."
Our task in this case is to construe a statute. In my
view, the answer is plainly compelled by the language
as well as the legislative history of the Securities Acts.
But even if the language is not "plain" to all, I would
have thought none could doubt that the statute can be
read fairly to support the result the Court reaches. Indeed, if one takes a different '.'iew-and imputes callousness to all who disagree-he must attribute a lack of legal
and social perception to the scores of federal judges who
have followed Birnbaum for two decades.
The dissenting opinion also chargP-s the Court with
paying "no heed to the unremedied wrong" arising from
the type of "fraud" that may result from reaffirmance
for more than 40 years. Precise factual accuracy with respect to
a corporate enterprise is frequently impossible, except with respect
to hard facts. The outcome of pending litigation, the effect of
relatively new legislation, the possible enactment of adverse legislation, the cost of projected construction or of entering new markets,
the expenditures needed to mee~ changing environmental regulations,
the likelihood and effect of new competition or of new technology,
and many similar matters of potential relevancy must be addressed
in registration statements and prospectuses. In administering the
1933 Act, the SEC traditionally and consistently has encouraged and
often required offerors to take conservative postures in prospectuses,
especially with respect to judgmental and possibly unfavorable
matters. If a different philosophy now were to be read into the
1934 Act, inviting litigation for arguably misleading understatement
as well as for overstatement of the Issuer's prospects, the hazard of
"going to market"-already not incoru;equential-would be immeasurably increased.
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of the Birnbaum rule. If an issue of statutory construction is to be decided on the basis of assuring a federal
remedy-in addition to state remedies-for every perceived fraud, at least we should strike a balance between
the opportunities for fraud presented by the contending
views. It may well be conceded that Birnbaum does
allow some fraud to go unremedied under the federal
Securities Acts. But the construction advocated by the
dissent could result in wider opportunities for fraud. As
the Court's opinion makes plain, abandoning the Birnbaum construction in favor of the rule urged by the dissent would invite any person who failed to purchase a
newly offered security that subsequently enjoyed substantial market appreciation to file a claim alleging that
the offering prospectus understated the company's potential. The number of possible plaintiffs with respect to a
public offering would be virtually unlimited. As noted
above (Part I, n. 2), an honest offeror could be confronted with subjective claims by plaintiffs who had
neither purchased its securities nor seriously considered
the investment. It frequently would be impossible to
refute a plaintiff's assertion that he relied on the prospectus, or even that he made a decision not to buy the
offered securities. A rule allowing this type of openended litigation would itself be an invitation to fraud. 5
5 The dissent also charges that WP are callous toward the "investing public"-a term it does not define. It would have been mort
accurate, perhaps, to have spoken of the nomnvesting public, because
the Court's decision does not abandon the investing pubhc. The
great majority of registered issues of securities are offered by establi~hed corporations that have shares outstandmg and held by members of the investing public. The typeR of suits that the dissent
would encourage could result 111 large damage claims, costly litigation,
generous settlements to avoid ::meh cost, and often-where the litigation runs its course-in large verdicts. The shareholders of the
defendant corporatwus-th0 "investmg publir."-would ultimately
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bear the burden of this litigation, including the fraudulent suits that
would not be screened out by the dissent's bare requirement of a
"logical nexus between the alleged fraud and the sale or purchase
of a security."
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MR. JusTICE BLACKBURN, dissenting.
Today the Court graves into stone Birnbaum's 1 arbitrary principle of standing. For this task the Court,
unfortunately, chooses to utilize thr<~e blunt chisels :
(1) reliance on the legislative history of the 1933 and
1934 Securities Acts, conceded as inconclusive in this
particular context; (2) acceptance as precedent of two
decades of lower court decisions following a doctrine,
never before examined here, that was pronounced by a
justifiably esteemed panel of that Court of Appeals regarded as the "Mother Court" in this area of the law/'
but under entirely different circumstances; and (3) resort to utter pi"agmaticality and a conJectural assertion
of "policy considerations" deemed to arise in distinguishmg the merito~ Rule 10b-5 suit from the
meretricious one. In f:!O doing, the Court exhibits a Rreternatural solicitousness for corporate well-being and a
-'""'--~seeming callousness toward the investing public quite·
out of keepmg, it seems to me, with our own traditions
and the intent of the secunties laws. See Affiliated Ute

-.........

• Birnbaum v. NPwport Steel Corp, 193 F. 2d 461 (CA2), cert.
denied, 34.11T S. 9.56 ( 1952).
2 .lust this Term, however, we d1d not view with ~urh tender
regard another dec1sion by the very ~;ame paneL See United States·
v. Feola, U S. (1975) , and It!:! treatment of an analogy
advanced in United States Y. Crimmw .~, 123 F . 2d 271 (CA2 1941).
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Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S. 128, 151 (1972);
Su,pt. of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U. S.
6, 12 (1971); SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U. S.
453, 463 (1969); Tcherepnin v.an~ 389 0. s.
,
336 (1967); SEC v. Capital Gains Burea'u, 375 U.S. 180,
195 (1963) .
The plaintiffs' complaint-and that is all that is before
us now-raises ~rbing claims of fraud. It alleges
that the directors .of 171\•Jew Blue Chip" and the majority
shareholders of "Old Blue Chip" engaged in a deceptive
and manipulative scheme designed to subvert the intent
of the 1967 antitrust consent decree and to enhance the
value of their own shares in a subsequent offering. Although the complaint is too long to reproduce here, see
App. 4-22, the plaintiffs, in short, contend that the
much-negotiated plan of reorganization of Old Blue
Chip, pursuant to the decree and approved by the district court, was intended to compensate former retailerusers of Blue Chip stamps for damages suffered as a
result of the antitrust violations. Accordingly, the
majority shareholders were to be divested of 55% of
their interest; Old Blue Chip was to be merged into a
new company; and 55% of the common shares of the new
company were to be offered to the former users on a pro
rata basis, determined by the quantity of stamps issued
to each of these nonshareholding users during a designated period. Some 621,000-- shares were thus to be ofeach consisting of three shares of common
and a $100 debenture, in return for $101 cash.
It is the plaintiffs' pleaded position that this offer to
the former users was intended by the antitrust court and
the Government to be a "bargain," since the then rea~
sonable market value of each unit was actually $315.
The plaintiffs alleged, however, that the offering share~
holders had no intention of complying in good faith with
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the terms of the consent decree and of permitting the
former users of Blue Chip stamps to obtain the bargain
offering. Rather, they conspired to dissuade the offerees
from purchasing the units by including substantially misleading and negative information in the prospectus under
the heading "Items of Special Interest." The prospectus
contained the following statements, allegedly false and
allegedly made to deter the plaintiffs from purchasing
the units: (1) that "[n]et income for the current fiscal
year will be adversely affected by payments aggregating
$8,486,000 made since March 2, 1968, in settlement of
claims" against New Blue Chip; (2) that net income
"would be adversely affected by a substantial decrease
in the use of the C0mpany's trading stamp service";
(3) that net income "would be adversely affected by a
sale of one-third of the Company's trading stamp business in California"; ( 4) that "Claims or Causes of Action (as defined) against the Company, including prayers for treble damages, now aggregate approximately
$29,000,000"; and ( 5) that, based upon 11 statistical evaluations," "the Company presently estimates that 97.5%·
of all stamps issued will ultimately be redeemed ." App,
56.
Plaintiffs alleged that these negative statements were
known, or should have been known, by the defendants to
be false since, for example, the $29,000,000 in purported
legal claims were settled for less than $1,000,000 only
three months later, and, as an historical fact, less than
90% of all trading stamps are redeemed. Importantly,
when the defendants offered their own shares for sale
to the public a year later, the prospectus issued at that
time made no reference to these factors even though, to
the extent that they were relevant on the date of the
first prospectus, one year earlier, they would have been
equally relevant on the date of the second. As a result

'
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of the defendants' negative statements, plaintiffs claim
that they were dissuaded from exercising their option to
purchase Blue Chip shares and that they were damaged
accordingly.
From a reading of the complaint in relation to the
language of § 10 (b) of the 1934 Act and of Rule lOb-5,
it is manifest that plaintiffs have alleged the use of a
deceptive scheme "in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security." To my mind, the word "sale"
ordinarily and naturally may be understood to mean not
only a single, individualized act transferring property
from one party to another, but also the generalized event
of public disposal of property througn advertisement,
auction, or some other market mechanism. Here, there
is an obvious, indeed a court-ordered, "sale" of securities
in the special offering of New Blue Chip shares and
debentures to former users. Yet the Court denies these
plaintiffs the right to maintain a suit under Rule 10b-5
because they do not fit into the mechanistic categories
of either "purchaser" or "seller.'' This, surely, is anom~
aly, for the very purpose of the alleged scheme was to
inhibit these plaintiffs from ever acquiring the status of
"purchaser." Faced with this abnormal divergence from
the usual pattern of securities frauds, the QQurt r>aY.§..!l.O
hP.ed to the unremedied wrong or to the portmanteau
nature o 1 ( ).
The broad purpose and scope of the Securities Ex~
change Act of 1934 are manifest. Senator Fletcher,
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency, in introducing S. 2693. the bill that became the
1934 Act, reviewed the general purposes of the
legislation:
"Manipulators who have in the past had a comparatively free hand to befwldle and fool the pubhe and to extract from the public millions of dollars
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through stock-exchange operations are to be curbed
and deprt;ed of tlie opportunity to grow fat on the
savings of the average man and woman of America.
Under this bill the ~ities exchanges will not only
have the appearance of an open marketplace for investors but will be truly open to them, free from the
hectic operations and dangerous practices which in
the past have enabled a handful of men to operate
with stacked cards against the general body of outside investors. For example, besides forbidding
fraudulent practices and unwholesome manipulation
by professional market operators, the bill seeks to
deprive corporate directors, corporate officers, and
other corporate insiders of the opportunity to play
the stocks of their companies against the interests
of the stockholders of their companies." 78 Cong.
Rec. 2271 (1934).
The Senator went on to describe the function of each of
the many provisions of the bill, including § 9 (c) which,
without significant alteration, became § 10 (b) of the
Act. He said, as to this section, in terms that surely
are broad:
"The Commission is also given power to forbid any
other devices in connection with security transactions which it finds detrimental to the public interest or to the proper protection of investors." Ibid.
Similarly, the broad scope of the identical provision
in the House version of the bill was emphasized by one
of the prinCipal draftsmen, in testimony before the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.
Summing up § 9 (c), he stated:
"Subsection (c) says, 1Thou shalt not devise any
other cunning devices.' . . . Of course subsection
(c) is a catch-all clause to prevent manipulative

'
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devices[.] I do not think there is any objection to
that kind of clause. The Commission should have
the authority to deal with new manipulative devices." Testimony of Thomas G. Corcoran, Hearing on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720 before the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
73d Cong., 2d Sess., 115 ( 1934).
In adopting Rule lOb-5 in 1942, the Securities and
Exchange Commission issued a press release stating:
"The new rule closes a loophole in the protections against
fraud administered by the Commission by prohibiting
individuals or companies from buying securities if they
en~_in fraud in their purcfiase." SEC Release No:
3230 T.l\Tay 2I, 1942). To say specifically that certain
types of fraud are within Rule lOb-5, of course, is not
to say that others are necessarily excluded. That this
is so is confirmed by the apparently casual origins of the
Rule, as recalled by a former SEC staff attorney in remarks made at a conference on federal securities laws
several years ago:
"It was one day in the year 1943, I believe. I
was sitting in my office in the S. E. C. building in
Philadelphia and I received a call from Jim Treanor
who was then the Director of the Trading and Exchange Divisien. He said, 'I have just been on the
telephone with Paul Rowen,' who was then the
S. E. C. Regional Administrator in Boston, 'and he
has told me about the president of some company
in Boston who is going around buying up the stock
of his company from h1s own shareholders at $4.00
a share, and he has been telling them that the company is doing very badly, whereas, in fact, the earnings are going to be quadrupled and will be $2.00
a share for this coming year ls there anything
we can do about it'?' So he came upstairs and I
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called in my secretary and I looked at Section 10 (b)
and I looked at Section 17, and I put them together,
and the only discussion we had there was where 'in
connection with the purchase or sale' should be, and
we decided it should be at the end.
"We called the Commission and we got on the
calendar, and I don't remember whether we got
there that morning or after lunch. We passed a
piece of paper around to all the commissioners. All
the commissioners read the rule and they tossed it
on the table, indicating approval. Nobody said
anything except Summer Pike who said, 'Well,' he
said, 'we are against fraud, aren't we?' That is
how it happened." Remarks of Milton Freeman,
Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities
Laws, 22 Bus. Law. 793,922 (1967).
The question under both Rule lOb-5 and its parent
statute, § 10 (b), is whether fraud was employed-and
the language is critical-by. "any person ... in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." On the
allegations here, the nexus between the asserted fraud
and the conducting of a "sale" is obvious and inescapable, and no more should be required to sustain the
plaintiffs' complaint against a motion to dismiss.
The fact situation in Birnbaum itself, of course, is far
removed from that now before the Court, for there the
fundament of the complaint was that the controlling
shareholder had misrepresented the circumstances of an
attractive merger offer and then, after rejecting the
merger, had sold his controlling shares at a price double
their then market value to a corporation formed by 10'
manufacturers who wished control of a captive source's
supply when there was a market shortage. The Second
Circuit turned aside an effort by small shareholders to·
bring this claim of breach of fiduciary duty under Rule

....
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10b-5 by concluding that the Rule and § 10 (b) pro~
tected only those who had bought or had sold securities.
Many cases applying the Birnbaum doctrine and con·
tinuing critical comments from the academic world 3 fol·
lowed in its wake, but until today the Court remained
serenely above the fray.
To support its decision to adopt the Birnbaum doc·
trine, the Court points to the "longstanding acceptance
by the courts" and to "Congress' failure to reject Birn·
baum's reasonable interpretation of the wording of § 10
(b)." Ante, p. 9. In addition, the Court purports to
find support in "extrinsic evidence from the texts of the
1933 and 1934 Acts," although it concedes this to be "not
conclusive." Ibid. But thP- greater portion of the
3 See, e. g., Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A
New Era for Rule 10b-5, 51 Va. L. Rev. 268 (1968); Boone &
McGowan, Standing to Sue Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 49 Tex. L. Rev.
617 (1971); Whitaker, The Birnbaum Doctrine : An Assessment,
23 Ala. L. Rev. 543 (1971) ; Ruder, Current Developments in the
Federal Law of Corporate Fiduciary Relations-Standing to Sue
Under Rule 10b-5, 26 Bus. La.w. 1289 (1971); Fuller, Another Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine : "Tolls the Knell of Parting Day?",
25 Miami L. Rev. 131 (1970); Comment, Dumping Birnbaum to
Force Analysis of the Standing Requirement under Rule lOb-5, 6
Loyola L. J. 230 (1975); Comment, Standing to Sue in lOb-5 Actions, 49 Notre D. Law. 1131 (1974); Comment, 10b-5 Standing
Under Birnbaum : The Case oi the Missing Remedy, 24 Hastings
L. J. 1007 (1973); Comment, The Purchaser-Seller Requirement of
Rule lOb-5 Re-evaluated, 44 Colo. L. Rev. 151 (1972); Comment,
Inroads on the Necessity for a Consummated Purchase or Sale
Under Rule lOb-5, 1969 Duke L. J. 349; Comment, The Decline
of the Purchaser-Seller Requirement of Rule lOb-5, 14 Villanova L.
Rev. 499 (1969) ; Comment, The Purchaser-Seller Limitation to
SEC Rule 10b-5, 53 Cornell L. Rev. 684 (1968) ; Comment, The
Purchaser-Seller Rule : An Archaic Tool for Determining Standing
Under Rule lOb-5, 56 Geo. L. J. 1177 (1968). See Note, Luniting
the Plaintiff Class : Rule 10b-5 and the Federal Securit1es Code, 72
Mich. L. Rev. 1398, 1412 (1974).
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Court's opinion is devoted to its discussion of the
"danger of vexatiousness," ante, p. 14, that accompanies
litigation under Rule lOb-5 and that is said to be "different in degree and in kind from that which accompanies
litigation in general." Ibid. It speaks of harm from
the "very pendency of the law suit," ante, p. 15, something like the recognized dilemma of the physician sued
for malpractice; of the "disruption of normal business
activities which may accompany a law suit," ante, p. 18;
and of "proof ... which depend[s] almost entirely on
oral testimony," ibid., as if all these were un~wn to
lawsuits taking place in America's courthouses every
day. In turning to, and being influenced by, these
"policy considerations," ante, p. 12, or these crconsiderations of policy," ante, p. 24, the Court, in my view,
unfortunately mires itself in speculation and conjecture
not usually seen in its opinions. In order to support an l
interpretation that obviously narrows a provision of the (
securities laws designed to be a "catch-all," the Court ·
takes alarm at t e "practical difficu t1es," ante, p. 29,
that would follow the removal of Birnbaum's barrier.
Certainly, this Court must be aware of the realities of
life, but it is unwarranted for the Court to take a form
of attenuated judicial notice of the motivations that
defense counsel may have in settling a case, or of the
difficulties that a plaintiff may have in proving his
claim.
Perhaps it is true that more cases that come within the
Birnbaum doctrine can be properly proved than those
that fall outside it. But this is no reason for denying
standing to sue to plaintiffs, such as those in this case,
who allegedly are injured by novel forms of manipulation. We should be wary about heeding the seductive
call of expediency and about substituting convenience
and ease of processing for the more difficult task of separating the genuine claim from the unfounded one.
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Instead of the artificiality of Birnbaum, the essential
test of a valid Rule 10b-5 claim, it seems to me, must
be the showing of a logical nexus between the alleged
fraud and the sale or purchase of a security. It is inconceivable that Congress could have intended a broadranging antifraud provision, such as § 10 (b), and, at
the same time, have intended to impose, or be deemed
to welcome, a mechanical overtone and requirement such
as the Birnbaum doctrine. The facts of this case, if
proved and accepted by the factfinder, surely are within
the conduct that Congress intended to ban. Whether
these particular plaintiffs, or any plaintiff, will be able
eventually to carry the burdens of proving fraud and of
proving reliance and damage-that is, causality and
injury-is a matter that should not be left to speculations of "policy" of the kind now advanced in this
forum so far removed from witnesses and evidence.
Finally, I am uneasy about the type of precedent the
present decision establishes. Policy considerations can
be applied and utilized in like fashion in other situations.
The acceptance of this decisional route in this case may
well come back to haunt us elsewhere before long. I
would decide the case to fulfill the broad purpose that
the language of the statutes and the le islative history
ictate, an I wou d av01 t e Court's pragmatic so utTOn resting upon a 20-year-old, severely criticized doctrine enunciated for a factually distinct situation.
In short, I would abandon the Birnbaum doctrine as a
rule of decision in favor of a more general test of nexus,
just as the Seventh Circuit did in Eason v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F. 2d 654, 661 (1973),
cert. denied, 416 U. S. 960 (1974). I would not worry
about any imagined inability of our federal trial nd
appellate courts to control the
of the types of
cases that the Court fears might result. Nor would I
yet be disturbed about dire consequences that a basically
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pessimistic attitude foresees if the Birnbaum doctrine :
were allowed quietly to expire. Sensible standards of
proof and of demonstrable damages would evolve and '
serye to protect. the worthY. and shut. o.ut. the frivolous ...

